| Summary: | <p><span>Within the EU, the perception that the convergence on the current set of rules is not capable of producing convergence on results, or generally better results, has increased socio-political fragmentation. The result has been an increasing demand for re-nationalisation of sovereign powers. Focusing on the euro area, the paper proposes to revise the monetary operations of the European Central Bank, current fiscal rules and the financial regulatory approach in order to tackle some of the main inconsistencies, rigidities and fragilities in the current design. The new design is thought out to require no changes in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, but at least a minimum political convergence. If successfully implemented, it would contribute to give a viable perspective to the design of the Economic and Monetary Union, capable of attracting those EU non-euro area countries that consider the mismanagement of the recent crisis and of its after-effects reason enough for resisting further losses of sovereignty.</span></p><p><span><strong>JEL codes</strong>: E52, E62, F33, F36, F45, G28</span></p><p><span><br /></span></p>
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