Transparent Contents and Trivial Inferences
DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxiii1.02 A possible way out to Kripke’s Puzzle About Belief could start from the rejection of the notion of epistemic transparency. Epistemic transparency seems, indeed, irremediably incompatible with an externalist conception of mental content. However, Brando...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne / The Polish Semiotic Society
2019-12-01
|
| Series: | Studia Semiotyczne |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://studiasemiotyczne.pts.edu.pl/index.php/Studiasemiotyczne/article/view/57 |