When It’s Good to Feel Bad: An Evolutionary Model of Guilt and Apology
We use techniques from evolutionary game theory to analyze the conditions under which guilt can provide individual fitness benefits, and so evolve. In particular, we focus on the benefits of guilty apology. We consider models where actors err in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma and have the option to...
Main Authors: | Sarita Rosenstock, Cailin O’Connor |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2018-03-01
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Series: | Frontiers in Robotics and AI |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/frobt.2018.00009/full |
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