Multi-Level Two-Sided Rating Protocol Design for Service Exchange Contest Dilemma in Crowdsensing
Strategic users in a service exchange application of crowdsensing are apt to exhibit malicious behaviors such as greed, free-ride, and attack, resulting in the phenomenon that no user is willing to serve others and low social utility is obtained in myopic equilibrium, which is considered as a servic...
Main Authors: | Jianfeng Lu, Shasha Yang, Zhao Zhang, Jianmin Han, Hao Peng, zhaolong Hu, Tian Wang |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
IEEE
2019-01-01
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Series: | IEEE Access |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8734050/ |
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