Facility-Associated Release of Polioviruses into Communities—Risks for the Posteradication Era

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative continues to make progress toward the eradication target. Indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) type 2 was last detected in 1999, WPV type 3 was last detected in 2012, and over the past 2 years WPV type 1 has been detected only in parts of 2 countries (Afghanistan...

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Main Authors: Ananda S. Bandyopadhyay, Harpal Singh, Jacqueline Fournier-Caruana, John F. Modlin, Jay Wenger, Jeffrey Partridge, Roland W. Sutter, Michel J. Zaffran
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2019-07-01
Series:Emerging Infectious Diseases
Subjects:
Online Access:https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/25/7/18-1703_article
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spelling doaj-a97ca2fcd0fe4c29971e51fe421a86232020-11-24T21:12:02ZengCenters for Disease Control and PreventionEmerging Infectious Diseases1080-60401080-60592019-07-012571363136910.3201/eid2507.181703Facility-Associated Release of Polioviruses into Communities—Risks for the Posteradication EraAnanda S. BandyopadhyayHarpal SinghJacqueline Fournier-CaruanaJohn F. ModlinJay WengerJeffrey PartridgeRoland W. SutterMichel J. ZaffranThe Global Polio Eradication Initiative continues to make progress toward the eradication target. Indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) type 2 was last detected in 1999, WPV type 3 was last detected in 2012, and over the past 2 years WPV type 1 has been detected only in parts of 2 countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan). Once the eradication of poliomyelitis is achieved, infectious and potentially infectious poliovirus materials retained in laboratories, vaccine production sites, and other storage facilities will continue to pose a risk for poliovirus reintroduction into communities. The recent breach in containment of WPV type 2 in an inactivated poliovirus vaccine manufacturing site in the Netherlands prompted this review, which summarizes information on facility-associated release of polioviruses into communities reported over >8 decades. Successful polio eradication requires the management of poliovirus containment posteradication to prevent the consequences of the reestablishment of poliovirus transmission.https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/25/7/18-1703_articlereemerging infectious diseaseaccidental releasebiologicallaboratory infectionscontainmentpoliovirus
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Ananda S. Bandyopadhyay
Harpal Singh
Jacqueline Fournier-Caruana
John F. Modlin
Jay Wenger
Jeffrey Partridge
Roland W. Sutter
Michel J. Zaffran
spellingShingle Ananda S. Bandyopadhyay
Harpal Singh
Jacqueline Fournier-Caruana
John F. Modlin
Jay Wenger
Jeffrey Partridge
Roland W. Sutter
Michel J. Zaffran
Facility-Associated Release of Polioviruses into Communities—Risks for the Posteradication Era
Emerging Infectious Diseases
reemerging infectious disease
accidental release
biological
laboratory infections
containment
poliovirus
author_facet Ananda S. Bandyopadhyay
Harpal Singh
Jacqueline Fournier-Caruana
John F. Modlin
Jay Wenger
Jeffrey Partridge
Roland W. Sutter
Michel J. Zaffran
author_sort Ananda S. Bandyopadhyay
title Facility-Associated Release of Polioviruses into Communities—Risks for the Posteradication Era
title_short Facility-Associated Release of Polioviruses into Communities—Risks for the Posteradication Era
title_full Facility-Associated Release of Polioviruses into Communities—Risks for the Posteradication Era
title_fullStr Facility-Associated Release of Polioviruses into Communities—Risks for the Posteradication Era
title_full_unstemmed Facility-Associated Release of Polioviruses into Communities—Risks for the Posteradication Era
title_sort facility-associated release of polioviruses into communities—risks for the posteradication era
publisher Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
series Emerging Infectious Diseases
issn 1080-6040
1080-6059
publishDate 2019-07-01
description The Global Polio Eradication Initiative continues to make progress toward the eradication target. Indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) type 2 was last detected in 1999, WPV type 3 was last detected in 2012, and over the past 2 years WPV type 1 has been detected only in parts of 2 countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan). Once the eradication of poliomyelitis is achieved, infectious and potentially infectious poliovirus materials retained in laboratories, vaccine production sites, and other storage facilities will continue to pose a risk for poliovirus reintroduction into communities. The recent breach in containment of WPV type 2 in an inactivated poliovirus vaccine manufacturing site in the Netherlands prompted this review, which summarizes information on facility-associated release of polioviruses into communities reported over >8 decades. Successful polio eradication requires the management of poliovirus containment posteradication to prevent the consequences of the reestablishment of poliovirus transmission.
topic reemerging infectious disease
accidental release
biological
laboratory infections
containment
poliovirus
url https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/25/7/18-1703_article
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