The Stackelberg Game Model for Vendor-managed Inventory Systems: A Wholesale Price Versus a Two-part Tariff Contract

This paper investigates the issue of replenishment coordination for a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturing vendor and multi retailers under vendor-managed inventory mode of operation. The demand is influenced by the retail price and market scale which generally recognized as a Cobb- Dougl...

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Main Authors: Yahia Zare Mehrjerdi, Mohsen Akhbari
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Kharazmi University 2020-05-01
Series:International Journal of Supply and Operations Management
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.ijsom.com/article_2812_1c08619b8169dfaaec8681182a7eeb04.pdf
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spelling doaj-ba027596142b4f88b4bc81bb2e4c9d0c2021-09-29T04:23:48ZengKharazmi UniversityInternational Journal of Supply and Operations Management2383-13592383-25252020-05-017214816310.22034/IJSOM.2020.2.42812The Stackelberg Game Model for Vendor-managed Inventory Systems: A Wholesale Price Versus a Two-part Tariff ContractYahia Zare Mehrjerdi0Mohsen Akhbari1Department of Industrial engineering, Yazd University Yazd IranYazd UniversityThis paper investigates the issue of replenishment coordination for a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturing vendor and multi retailers under vendor-managed inventory mode of operation. The demand is influenced by the retail price and market scale which generally recognized as a Cobb- Douglas demand function in the available studies. Authors developed Stackelberg game theoretic model for examining vendor-managed inventory supply chain performance in terms of combined profit. The aim is to find the wholesale and retail price, the replenishment interval of the retailers, and the fraction backlogging so as to the combined profit of supply chain being optimized. Authors formulates the problem as NLP models while two different contracts including wholesale price and two-part tariff are also being taken into consideration. Using some benchmark data, authors compared and illustrated how such contracts can optimize the performance of VMI-type supply chains. Results from numerical experimental study show that the wholesale price is more benefitting to all supply chain members under specific conditions. Moreover, sensitivity analyses on model’s parameters are performed to assess the impacts of changes on the performance of supply chain.http://www.ijsom.com/article_2812_1c08619b8169dfaaec8681182a7eeb04.pdfvendor managed inventorygame theorywholesale pricetwo-part tariffsupply chain
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Yahia Zare Mehrjerdi
Mohsen Akhbari
spellingShingle Yahia Zare Mehrjerdi
Mohsen Akhbari
The Stackelberg Game Model for Vendor-managed Inventory Systems: A Wholesale Price Versus a Two-part Tariff Contract
International Journal of Supply and Operations Management
vendor managed inventory
game theory
wholesale price
two-part tariff
supply chain
author_facet Yahia Zare Mehrjerdi
Mohsen Akhbari
author_sort Yahia Zare Mehrjerdi
title The Stackelberg Game Model for Vendor-managed Inventory Systems: A Wholesale Price Versus a Two-part Tariff Contract
title_short The Stackelberg Game Model for Vendor-managed Inventory Systems: A Wholesale Price Versus a Two-part Tariff Contract
title_full The Stackelberg Game Model for Vendor-managed Inventory Systems: A Wholesale Price Versus a Two-part Tariff Contract
title_fullStr The Stackelberg Game Model for Vendor-managed Inventory Systems: A Wholesale Price Versus a Two-part Tariff Contract
title_full_unstemmed The Stackelberg Game Model for Vendor-managed Inventory Systems: A Wholesale Price Versus a Two-part Tariff Contract
title_sort stackelberg game model for vendor-managed inventory systems: a wholesale price versus a two-part tariff contract
publisher Kharazmi University
series International Journal of Supply and Operations Management
issn 2383-1359
2383-2525
publishDate 2020-05-01
description This paper investigates the issue of replenishment coordination for a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturing vendor and multi retailers under vendor-managed inventory mode of operation. The demand is influenced by the retail price and market scale which generally recognized as a Cobb- Douglas demand function in the available studies. Authors developed Stackelberg game theoretic model for examining vendor-managed inventory supply chain performance in terms of combined profit. The aim is to find the wholesale and retail price, the replenishment interval of the retailers, and the fraction backlogging so as to the combined profit of supply chain being optimized. Authors formulates the problem as NLP models while two different contracts including wholesale price and two-part tariff are also being taken into consideration. Using some benchmark data, authors compared and illustrated how such contracts can optimize the performance of VMI-type supply chains. Results from numerical experimental study show that the wholesale price is more benefitting to all supply chain members under specific conditions. Moreover, sensitivity analyses on model’s parameters are performed to assess the impacts of changes on the performance of supply chain.
topic vendor managed inventory
game theory
wholesale price
two-part tariff
supply chain
url http://www.ijsom.com/article_2812_1c08619b8169dfaaec8681182a7eeb04.pdf
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