The Stackelberg Game Model for Vendor-managed Inventory Systems: A Wholesale Price Versus a Two-part Tariff Contract
This paper investigates the issue of replenishment coordination for a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturing vendor and multi retailers under vendor-managed inventory mode of operation. The demand is influenced by the retail price and market scale which generally recognized as a Cobb- Dougl...
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doaj-ba027596142b4f88b4bc81bb2e4c9d0c2021-09-29T04:23:48ZengKharazmi UniversityInternational Journal of Supply and Operations Management2383-13592383-25252020-05-017214816310.22034/IJSOM.2020.2.42812The Stackelberg Game Model for Vendor-managed Inventory Systems: A Wholesale Price Versus a Two-part Tariff ContractYahia Zare Mehrjerdi0Mohsen Akhbari1Department of Industrial engineering, Yazd University Yazd IranYazd UniversityThis paper investigates the issue of replenishment coordination for a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturing vendor and multi retailers under vendor-managed inventory mode of operation. The demand is influenced by the retail price and market scale which generally recognized as a Cobb- Douglas demand function in the available studies. Authors developed Stackelberg game theoretic model for examining vendor-managed inventory supply chain performance in terms of combined profit. The aim is to find the wholesale and retail price, the replenishment interval of the retailers, and the fraction backlogging so as to the combined profit of supply chain being optimized. Authors formulates the problem as NLP models while two different contracts including wholesale price and two-part tariff are also being taken into consideration. Using some benchmark data, authors compared and illustrated how such contracts can optimize the performance of VMI-type supply chains. Results from numerical experimental study show that the wholesale price is more benefitting to all supply chain members under specific conditions. Moreover, sensitivity analyses on model’s parameters are performed to assess the impacts of changes on the performance of supply chain.http://www.ijsom.com/article_2812_1c08619b8169dfaaec8681182a7eeb04.pdfvendor managed inventorygame theorywholesale pricetwo-part tariffsupply chain |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Yahia Zare Mehrjerdi Mohsen Akhbari |
spellingShingle |
Yahia Zare Mehrjerdi Mohsen Akhbari The Stackelberg Game Model for Vendor-managed Inventory Systems: A Wholesale Price Versus a Two-part Tariff Contract International Journal of Supply and Operations Management vendor managed inventory game theory wholesale price two-part tariff supply chain |
author_facet |
Yahia Zare Mehrjerdi Mohsen Akhbari |
author_sort |
Yahia Zare Mehrjerdi |
title |
The Stackelberg Game Model for Vendor-managed Inventory Systems: A Wholesale Price Versus a Two-part Tariff Contract |
title_short |
The Stackelberg Game Model for Vendor-managed Inventory Systems: A Wholesale Price Versus a Two-part Tariff Contract |
title_full |
The Stackelberg Game Model for Vendor-managed Inventory Systems: A Wholesale Price Versus a Two-part Tariff Contract |
title_fullStr |
The Stackelberg Game Model for Vendor-managed Inventory Systems: A Wholesale Price Versus a Two-part Tariff Contract |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Stackelberg Game Model for Vendor-managed Inventory Systems: A Wholesale Price Versus a Two-part Tariff Contract |
title_sort |
stackelberg game model for vendor-managed inventory systems: a wholesale price versus a two-part tariff contract |
publisher |
Kharazmi University |
series |
International Journal of Supply and Operations Management |
issn |
2383-1359 2383-2525 |
publishDate |
2020-05-01 |
description |
This paper investigates the issue of replenishment coordination for a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturing vendor and multi retailers under vendor-managed inventory mode of operation. The demand is influenced by the retail price and market scale which generally recognized as a Cobb- Douglas demand function in the available studies. Authors developed Stackelberg game theoretic model for examining vendor-managed inventory supply chain performance in terms of combined profit. The aim is to find the wholesale and retail price, the replenishment interval of the retailers, and the fraction backlogging so as to the combined profit of supply chain being optimized. Authors formulates the problem as NLP models while two different contracts including wholesale price and two-part tariff are also being taken into consideration. Using some benchmark data, authors compared and illustrated how such contracts can optimize the performance of VMI-type supply chains. Results from numerical experimental study show that the wholesale price is more benefitting to all supply chain members under specific conditions. Moreover, sensitivity analyses on model’s parameters are performed to assess the impacts of changes on the performance of supply chain. |
topic |
vendor managed inventory game theory wholesale price two-part tariff supply chain |
url |
http://www.ijsom.com/article_2812_1c08619b8169dfaaec8681182a7eeb04.pdf |
work_keys_str_mv |
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