The Mickey Mouse problem: Distinguishing religious and fictional counterintuitive agents.

The Mickey Mouse problem refers to the difficulty in predicting which supernatural agents are capable of eliciting belief and religious devotion. We approached the problem directly by asking participants to invent a "religious" or a "fictional" agent with five supernatural abilit...

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Main Authors: Thomas Swan, Jamin Halberstadt
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2019-01-01
Series:PLoS ONE
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220886
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spelling doaj-daa05877f81349d78526b91181882cfe2021-03-03T21:14:10ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032019-01-01148e022088610.1371/journal.pone.0220886The Mickey Mouse problem: Distinguishing religious and fictional counterintuitive agents.Thomas SwanJamin HalberstadtThe Mickey Mouse problem refers to the difficulty in predicting which supernatural agents are capable of eliciting belief and religious devotion. We approached the problem directly by asking participants to invent a "religious" or a "fictional" agent with five supernatural abilities. Compared to fictional agents, religious agents were ascribed a higher proportion of abilities that violated folk psychology or that were ambiguous-violating nonspecific or multiple domains of folk knowledge-and fewer abilities that violated folk physics and biology. Similarly, participants rated folk psychology violations provided by the experimenter as more characteristic of religious agents than were violations of folk physics or folk biology, while fictional agents showed no clear pattern. Religious agents were also judged as more potentially beneficial, and more ambivalent (i.e., similar ratings of benefit and harm), than fictional agents, regardless of whether the agents were invented or well-known to participants. Together, the results support a motivational account of religious belief formation that is facilitated by these biases.https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220886
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Thomas Swan
Jamin Halberstadt
spellingShingle Thomas Swan
Jamin Halberstadt
The Mickey Mouse problem: Distinguishing religious and fictional counterintuitive agents.
PLoS ONE
author_facet Thomas Swan
Jamin Halberstadt
author_sort Thomas Swan
title The Mickey Mouse problem: Distinguishing religious and fictional counterintuitive agents.
title_short The Mickey Mouse problem: Distinguishing religious and fictional counterintuitive agents.
title_full The Mickey Mouse problem: Distinguishing religious and fictional counterintuitive agents.
title_fullStr The Mickey Mouse problem: Distinguishing religious and fictional counterintuitive agents.
title_full_unstemmed The Mickey Mouse problem: Distinguishing religious and fictional counterintuitive agents.
title_sort mickey mouse problem: distinguishing religious and fictional counterintuitive agents.
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
series PLoS ONE
issn 1932-6203
publishDate 2019-01-01
description The Mickey Mouse problem refers to the difficulty in predicting which supernatural agents are capable of eliciting belief and religious devotion. We approached the problem directly by asking participants to invent a "religious" or a "fictional" agent with five supernatural abilities. Compared to fictional agents, religious agents were ascribed a higher proportion of abilities that violated folk psychology or that were ambiguous-violating nonspecific or multiple domains of folk knowledge-and fewer abilities that violated folk physics and biology. Similarly, participants rated folk psychology violations provided by the experimenter as more characteristic of religious agents than were violations of folk physics or folk biology, while fictional agents showed no clear pattern. Religious agents were also judged as more potentially beneficial, and more ambivalent (i.e., similar ratings of benefit and harm), than fictional agents, regardless of whether the agents were invented or well-known to participants. Together, the results support a motivational account of religious belief formation that is facilitated by these biases.
url https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220886
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