| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立彰化師範大學 === 商業教育學系 === 87 === Firm''s Optimal Return and Pricing
Policy on Channel Coordination
ABSTRACT
This study explored the return policy under the channel coordination. The researcher used the game theory and newsboy problem to form return and pricing models between the channel members--manufacturer and retailer. In this study, four alternative models--whether these two parties coordinate and whether manufacturer adopts the return policy--were discussed. In addition, the researcher used the soft-package of Mathematica and numerical parameters to provide numerical examples. According to the numerical examples, the following results were derived.
1. Under non-coordination, the return policy increases the value of retail
price; however, under coordination, the return
policy decreases the value of retail price.
1. Under non-coordination, the return policy decreases the quantities; however, under coordination, the return policy increases quantities.
1. Whether manufacturer adopts the return policy or not, retailer''s profit will increase under coordination.
1. Manufacturer''s profit will raise if he adopts the return policy and coordinate with retailer.
In a word, for manufacturer, the return policy is gainful. That''s because return policy will increase wholesale price, and manufacturer''s profit. Therefore manufacturer will prefer to adopt return policy. Whether manufacturer adopts return policy or not, retailer''s profit will increase under coordination. So the whole channel profit will raise when two parties--manufacturer and retailer--coordinate.
Key Word: return policy, channel coordination, game
theory, newsboy problem.
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