The Influence of PRC’ Deterrence Strategy to the Security of Taiwan Strait The Study of PLA’s Second Artillery Development.

• Main Authors: Day,Junn-Ling, 戴振良
• Other Authors: Wong,Ming-Hsien
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2002
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/54243867877175964705

碩士 === 淡江大學 === 國際事務與戰略研究所 === 90 === Deterrence and war are the two functions processed by the PRC national defense, the defense requirement in peacetime is to win without waging a war, and prevent wars; the requirement in wartime is to fight and surpass, and win the wars. Therefore, the PRC needs to stress an actual combat (war) and also strive for deterrence (peace) and defense. Contemporarily, the PRC relies on the utilization of ballistic and cruise missiles to successfully take over Taiwan and also not to cause excessive damages, this conforms the future threat to Taiwan conflicts, it is believed that the PRC will launch electrical pulse attack to the crucial urban and military facilities of ROC, in order to paralyze the C4ISR; or take the option of lurk and destruct, to create psychological fear to the civilians, achieving maximum effect with minimum cost and also not to cause international attention, which is in line with its purpose of adopting Taiwan without costing lives. The ROC should take early caution to face the PRC missile threat and attack. This paper is conducted by content analysis and literature research. It consists of six chapters, in addition to the chapter one of introduction and chapter six of conclusion; the main text is divided into four chapters. Chapter two studies the thoughts of PRC deterrence strategy, in the perspectives of historical development and theories and concepts of deterrence strategy thinking; means and tools of defense deterrence；and designing and guidance of deterrence strategy. Chapter three explores the current situation of PRC second artillery units, which consists of evolution, organization, deployment, and categories and performance of in-service strategic (tactical) missiles. It further discusses the development and utilization of PRC second artillery units, and explains it with regards to effects of strategic strike and applications of tactical patterns. Chapter four explores the PRC second artillery units’ influence on Taiwan Straits security, with regards to the military imbalance of Asian Pacific, Mainland China policies and communication deadlock across the Straits, and ROC’s current air defense and anti-missile capability considering critical factors to the Taiwan Straits conflicts, which highlights the gap of military power across the Straits. Chapter five aims at the security thinking of ROC in light of the PRC second artillery deterrence threat and suggests countermeasures regarding defense policy, military strategy, force planning, and combat readiness, which is expected to innovate the defense strategy thinking and for the reference of defense decision making. This paper reveals: (1) If Taiwan claims independent, will PRC be so angry and to turn hostile suddenly from “Chinese don’t attack Chinese” to “Chinese will certainly attack Taiwanese”, and even uses nuclear weapons? (2) Where does our deterrence power in security strategy exist? Is it capable of fulfilling the strategic objective of “effective deterrence”? (3) In order to secure our air defense, we should aggressively adopt advanced foreign air defense thinking, and establish our air surveillance and reconnaissance and upgrade our anti-missile network, in order to implement the mission of defending national security.