The Role of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance in Corporate Governance–An Empirical Study on Electronic Industry in Taiwan
博士 === 國立中央大學 === 企業管理研究所 === 94 === Holderness (1990) suggests that director’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance has an important governance role in publicly owned companies. O’Sullivan (1997) empirically tests Holderness’s monitoring hypothesis, the results generally support the monitorin...
Main Authors: | Jung-Ho Lu, 盧榮和 |
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Other Authors: | Der-Juinn Horng |
Format: | Others |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
2005
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Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/14491880320356160978 |
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