The Impact of Proxy Solicitation on Shareholder’s Wealth: Evidence from Listed Corporation in Taiwan
碩士 === 淡江大學 === 國際貿易學系國際企業學碩士在職專班 === 94 === According to Corporate Law No. 174, “decisions of stockholders’ meetings, should be attended by a quorum of over half the shareholders of all issued shares, and shall be agreed to by over half of those present.” Yet, domestic listed companies have a decre...
Main Authors: | Hsiu-Feng Chi, 紀秀鳳 |
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Other Authors: | Yuh-Yeh Pan |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2004
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Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/03473104863181754397 |
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