The Study of Relationship between Directors’ and Supervisors’ Tenures and Corporate Performance

• Main Authors: Yu-Man Kuo, 郭于滿
• Other Authors: 林宗輝
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2006
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/90069822463167914089

碩士 === 元智大學 === 會計學系 === 94 === Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, corporate governance has been the major issues concerning in the capital market in recent years. Academic literatures focus on the discussion of the association between board contexture, stock share contexture, administration style andcorporate performance.Furthermore, considering the quality of board oversight has received increasing attention in recent years. This paper investigates whether the board construction on corporate governance mechanism effectively discharge its monitoring function and mitigate central agency problem.This paper study of relationship between directors’ and supervisors’ tenures and corporate performance. The 1791 samples are selected from the public companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation from 2002 to 2004. This thesis tries to find the relationship between board contexture, stock share contexture, administration style, directors’ and supervisors’ tenures and corporate performance. The conclusions of our findings are as follows: 1. In the board contexture, the scale of the board has a negative relation with the firm’s performance, but is not significantly. The ratio of independent directors has significantly positive relation with the firm’s performance. 2. In the stock share contexture, the ratio of the stock held by the institutions, directors and supervisors, the managers, have significantly positive relationship with the firm’s performance. The ratio of the stock held by the big shareholders has a significantly negative relation with the firm’s performance. The Pledged Shares Ratio of Directors’ and Supervisors’ Shareholdings has a significantly negative relation with the firm’s performance. 3. In the administration style, the board of director concurrent general manager has a significantly negative relation with the firm’s performance. 4. In the tenures, directors’ and supervisors’ tenures have significantly negative relation with the firm’s performance.