The Function of Auditors and Independent Directors in Corporate Governance

• Main Authors: Mao-Chang,Wang, 王茂昌
• Other Authors: Shih-Tsung,Chiu
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2008
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/37895566814451238459

博士 === 國立臺北大學 === 會計學系 === 96 === The main purposes of this thesis are to discuss the function of the auditor and the independent director in the situation that the firm must fund by equity capital under the environment of building and implementing the corporate governance, and to understand the strategy choice of managers, auditors and independent directors. This thesis is derived from game theory. The research model considers the role of the manager, the auditor and the independent director. The main results are: (1) Except the auditor and the independent director (adopts the flexible salary) do not have independence must meet specific conditions, when we consider the auditor's auditing function, or consider the auditor's auditing function and independent director's function at the same time, it will increase the manager's possibility of choosing the project that is benefit to investors, (2) Building and implementing the corporate governance, the manager will report honestly, and the auditor or the independent director will maintain his independence. (3) When the independent director adopts the fixed payoff, the independent director is easier to maintain independence. (4) When the independent director does not have independence, it may decrease the information asymmetry problem between the manager and investor effectively while meeting specific conditions. (5) If the independent director has independence, the more the manager’s private interests is, the more the contribution for solving the under-capitalizing problem.