| Summary: | 博士 === 國立中正大學 === 財務金融所 === 98 === Issue one：
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ownership structure and board characteristics on firm performance from the perspective of core agency problem. In addition, we also investigate the monitoring effect of insider ownership, and institutional ownership. The empirical results indicate as follows：First, managerial ownership is positively related to firm performance and hence supports convergence-of-interest hypothesis, but the family ownership is negatively related to firm performance. Second, as controlling right deviates from cash flow right, firm performance is getting worse, that is, core agency problems become more serious in the firm. Third, both managerial ownership and family ownership have an inverted U-shape relationship with firm performance. Finally, classical owner-manager conflict is more costly than that of conflict between family and minority shareholders in family firms.
Issue two：
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ownership structure and board characteristics on earnings management from the perspective of core agency problem. In addition, we also investigate the monitoring effect of the institutional investors, and the outside directors. The empirical results indicate as follows：First, managerial ownership is negatively related to earnings management and hence supports convergence of interest hypothesis. Second, when managers of the companies have more control rights than cash flow right, which results in a core agency problem, manager are more likely to manage earnings. Third, the managerial ownership has an U-shape relationship with earnings management. Fourth, before reached the goal of earnings, manager have more earnings management behavior. Finally, the pledged share ratio of directors and chairman served CEO have positive relationship with earning management, but the shares of board directors, institutional ownership and the number of the outside directors have negative relationship with earning management.
|
|---|
