The Optimal Licensing Contract Of An Insider
碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 國際經濟研究所 === 99 === The paper discusses the optimal licensing of an insider innovative firm, who considers to license a cost-reducing innovation to some or to all of the production firms in the market. The paper sets up a three-stage game model, in which the R&D firm chooses the...
Main Authors: | Huang,chienying, 黃千瑛 |
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Other Authors: | Chen, Ho-Chyuan |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2011
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Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/83135276186295862661 |
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