A game theoretic analysis of property rights by theft

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 財政研究所 === 101 === This paper which continues the study from Rose (2010) focuses on the question whether a buyer of a stolen good should obtain title to the good if he/she has purchased it in good faith. We use game model to analyze three different regulations - a rule of law wher...

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Main Author: 林宛萱
Other Authors: 王智賢
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/79315278703065469874
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spelling ndltd-TW-101NCCU53030252016-07-31T04:21:15Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/79315278703065469874 A game theoretic analysis of property rights by theft 贓物所有權歸屬之賽局分析 林宛萱 碩士 國立政治大學 財政研究所 101 This paper which continues the study from Rose (2010) focuses on the question whether a buyer of a stolen good should obtain title to the good if he/she has purchased it in good faith. We use game model to analyze three different regulations - a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant, a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer, and the real regulation in Taiwan. Finally, in discussing social utility, we compare efficiency among the three regulations, and reach our conclusion that when the potential buyer’s utilities of having the ownership are higher than the owner’s, a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant is the most efficient. On the contrary, when the potential buyer’s utilities of having the ownership are lower than the original owner’s, a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer is the most efficient. Considering efficiency, the regulation in Taiwan is not the best to the society so the government may amend the regulation. 王智賢 學位論文 ; thesis 35 zh-TW
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language zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 財政研究所 === 101 === This paper which continues the study from Rose (2010) focuses on the question whether a buyer of a stolen good should obtain title to the good if he/she has purchased it in good faith. We use game model to analyze three different regulations - a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant, a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer, and the real regulation in Taiwan. Finally, in discussing social utility, we compare efficiency among the three regulations, and reach our conclusion that when the potential buyer’s utilities of having the ownership are higher than the owner’s, a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant is the most efficient. On the contrary, when the potential buyer’s utilities of having the ownership are lower than the original owner’s, a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer is the most efficient. Considering efficiency, the regulation in Taiwan is not the best to the society so the government may amend the regulation.
author2 王智賢
author_facet 王智賢
林宛萱
author 林宛萱
spellingShingle 林宛萱
A game theoretic analysis of property rights by theft
author_sort 林宛萱
title A game theoretic analysis of property rights by theft
title_short A game theoretic analysis of property rights by theft
title_full A game theoretic analysis of property rights by theft
title_fullStr A game theoretic analysis of property rights by theft
title_full_unstemmed A game theoretic analysis of property rights by theft
title_sort game theoretic analysis of property rights by theft
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/79315278703065469874
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