Corporate Governance Mechanism and Stock Price Non-synchronicity

碩士 === 國立臺中科技大學 === 財務金融研究所碩士班 === 105 === In this study, the Taiwan 100 Index constituent stocks defined in the Taiwan Economic Journal database from January 2007 to August 2016 were sampled. The shareholding structure, the composition of the board of directors and the separation of the shares have...

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Main Authors: Ying-Chieh Lo, 羅盈潔
Other Authors: Chia-Hao Lee
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2017
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/354ewt
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spelling ndltd-TW-105NTTI53040172019-09-24T03:34:14Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/354ewt Corporate Governance Mechanism and Stock Price Non-synchronicity 公司治理機制與股價非同步性 Ying-Chieh Lo 羅盈潔 碩士 國立臺中科技大學 財務金融研究所碩士班 105 In this study, the Taiwan 100 Index constituent stocks defined in the Taiwan Economic Journal database from January 2007 to August 2016 were sampled. The shareholding structure, the composition of the board of directors and the separation of the shares have discussed the relationship with the stock price non-synchronicity. In this paper, the new variables are synthesized and the weights are given by principal component analysis. Then, the new variables are renamed and the regression analysis is carried out again. The regression analysis is carried out. The empirical results show that the proportion of directors and supervisors in the ownership structure, the proportion of the majority shareholder''s shareholding, the proportion of the final controller''s shareholding and the manager''s shareholding ratio are positively related to the non-synchronization of the stock price. Means that when managers stake, the higher the share price implied by the more true message, the more can reduce the agency problems. However, the relevant variables formed by the board of directors are negatively correlated with the ownership structure, and the results show that the variables will make the stock price reward and market compensation highly relevant. The stock price in the stock price that the company contains a small amount of information, there are advantages of the company occupied the wealth of the problem. Finally, the empirical results of the share separation variable are the positive correlation, and the greater the deviation of the cash flow claim right and the voting right is, the ultimate controller''s interests are in line with the company''s interests. Key Words:Corporate Governance, Stock Price Synchronicity, Principal Component Analysis. Chia-Hao Lee 李家豪 2017 學位論文 ; thesis 36 zh-TW
collection NDLTD
language zh-TW
format Others
sources NDLTD
description 碩士 === 國立臺中科技大學 === 財務金融研究所碩士班 === 105 === In this study, the Taiwan 100 Index constituent stocks defined in the Taiwan Economic Journal database from January 2007 to August 2016 were sampled. The shareholding structure, the composition of the board of directors and the separation of the shares have discussed the relationship with the stock price non-synchronicity. In this paper, the new variables are synthesized and the weights are given by principal component analysis. Then, the new variables are renamed and the regression analysis is carried out again. The regression analysis is carried out. The empirical results show that the proportion of directors and supervisors in the ownership structure, the proportion of the majority shareholder''s shareholding, the proportion of the final controller''s shareholding and the manager''s shareholding ratio are positively related to the non-synchronization of the stock price. Means that when managers stake, the higher the share price implied by the more true message, the more can reduce the agency problems. However, the relevant variables formed by the board of directors are negatively correlated with the ownership structure, and the results show that the variables will make the stock price reward and market compensation highly relevant. The stock price in the stock price that the company contains a small amount of information, there are advantages of the company occupied the wealth of the problem. Finally, the empirical results of the share separation variable are the positive correlation, and the greater the deviation of the cash flow claim right and the voting right is, the ultimate controller''s interests are in line with the company''s interests. Key Words:Corporate Governance, Stock Price Synchronicity, Principal Component Analysis.
author2 Chia-Hao Lee
author_facet Chia-Hao Lee
Ying-Chieh Lo
羅盈潔
author Ying-Chieh Lo
羅盈潔
spellingShingle Ying-Chieh Lo
羅盈潔
Corporate Governance Mechanism and Stock Price Non-synchronicity
author_sort Ying-Chieh Lo
title Corporate Governance Mechanism and Stock Price Non-synchronicity
title_short Corporate Governance Mechanism and Stock Price Non-synchronicity
title_full Corporate Governance Mechanism and Stock Price Non-synchronicity
title_fullStr Corporate Governance Mechanism and Stock Price Non-synchronicity
title_full_unstemmed Corporate Governance Mechanism and Stock Price Non-synchronicity
title_sort corporate governance mechanism and stock price non-synchronicity
publishDate 2017
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/354ewt
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