An Empirical Study on the Incentive Alignment Functions of Executive Stock Options

• Main Authors: WEI, CHIA-YI, 魏嘉儀
• Other Authors: WU, E-CHING
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2018
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/x5yz3p

碩士 === 靜宜大學 === 財務金融學系 === 106 === In 2000, Taiwan relaxed restrictions on its corporate treasury shares, allowing company to transfer them to its employees; then the accounting scandal about the employee bonus shares identification error burst. In recent years, more and more companies choose to use executive stock options as incentive salary, thus this article examines the incentive effect of issuing executive stock options and inspects whether the manager recognizes the intention of issuing executive stock options and gives some positive benefits to the company. In addition, this article also wants to discover whether the incentive effect will change due to the higher financial leverage of the corporate. This article adopts listed companies in Taiwan from 2009 to 2016 as samples, analyzing the influence of senior manager’s ESO rate on corporate performance, and its incentive effects. The result shows that there is a positive influence on the incentive effect of issuing senior employee with executive stock options. The research method is based on the regression of cross-items between financial leverage and senior management's ESO. It points out that the incentive effect of the manager's, considering the financial status of the company, does have a positive effect.