Civil-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes

abstract: This dissertation proposes a theory of authoritarian control of the armed forces using the economic theory of the firm. To establish a “master-servant” relationship, an organization structures governance as a long-term contractual agreement to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with...

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Other Authors: Zerba, Shaio Hui (Author)
Format: Doctoral Thesis
Language:English
Published: 2019
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.I.53732
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spelling ndltd-asu.edu-item-537322019-05-16T03:01:40Z Civil-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes abstract: This dissertation proposes a theory of authoritarian control of the armed forces using the economic theory of the firm. To establish a “master-servant” relationship, an organization structures governance as a long-term contractual agreement to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with uncertainty and bilateral dependency. The bargaining power for civilian and military actors entering a contractual relationship is assessed by two dimensions: the negotiated political property rights and the credible guarantee of those rights. These dimensions outline four civil-military institutional arrangements or army types (cartel, cadre, entrepreneur, and patron armies) in an authoritarian system. In the cycle of repression, the more the dictator relies on the military for repression to stay in office, the more negotiated political property rights obtained by the military; and the more rights obtained by the military the less civilian control. Thus, the dependence on coercive violence entails a paradox for the dictator—the agents empowered to manage violence are also empowered to act against the regime. To minimize this threat, the dictator may choose to default on the political bargain through coup-proofing strategies at the cost to the regime’s credibility and reputation, later impacting a military’s decision to defend, defect, or coup during times of crisis. The cycle of repression captures the various stages in the life-cycle of the political contract between the regime and the armed forces providing insights into institutional changes governing the relationship. As such, this project furthers our understanding of the complexities of authoritarian civil–military relations and contributes conceptual tools for future studies. Dissertation/Thesis Zerba, Shaio Hui (Author) Thies, Cameron (Advisor) Wood, Reed (Committee member) Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah (Committee member) Arizona State University (Publisher) Political science International relations Asia Authoritarian Regimes Civil-Military Relations Military Security eng 236 pages Doctoral Dissertation Political Science 2019 Doctoral Dissertation http://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.I.53732 http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ 2019
collection NDLTD
language English
format Doctoral Thesis
sources NDLTD
topic Political science
International relations
Asia
Authoritarian Regimes
Civil-Military Relations
Military
Security
spellingShingle Political science
International relations
Asia
Authoritarian Regimes
Civil-Military Relations
Military
Security
Civil-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes
description abstract: This dissertation proposes a theory of authoritarian control of the armed forces using the economic theory of the firm. To establish a “master-servant” relationship, an organization structures governance as a long-term contractual agreement to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with uncertainty and bilateral dependency. The bargaining power for civilian and military actors entering a contractual relationship is assessed by two dimensions: the negotiated political property rights and the credible guarantee of those rights. These dimensions outline four civil-military institutional arrangements or army types (cartel, cadre, entrepreneur, and patron armies) in an authoritarian system. In the cycle of repression, the more the dictator relies on the military for repression to stay in office, the more negotiated political property rights obtained by the military; and the more rights obtained by the military the less civilian control. Thus, the dependence on coercive violence entails a paradox for the dictator—the agents empowered to manage violence are also empowered to act against the regime. To minimize this threat, the dictator may choose to default on the political bargain through coup-proofing strategies at the cost to the regime’s credibility and reputation, later impacting a military’s decision to defend, defect, or coup during times of crisis. The cycle of repression captures the various stages in the life-cycle of the political contract between the regime and the armed forces providing insights into institutional changes governing the relationship. As such, this project furthers our understanding of the complexities of authoritarian civil–military relations and contributes conceptual tools for future studies. === Dissertation/Thesis === Doctoral Dissertation Political Science 2019
author2 Zerba, Shaio Hui (Author)
author_facet Zerba, Shaio Hui (Author)
title Civil-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes
title_short Civil-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes
title_full Civil-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes
title_fullStr Civil-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes
title_full_unstemmed Civil-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes
title_sort civil-military relations in authoritarian regimes
publishDate 2019
url http://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.I.53732
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