The Human Being as ‘Compound’: Aquinas versus Descartes on Human Nature
The intuitively right answer to the question ‘What am I?’ is not ‘an incorporeal spirit’, but ‘a human being’. Aquinas reflects this common-sense view when he says that ‘the human is no mere soul, but a compound of soul and body.’ And Descartes, despite his notorious dualistic thesis that I am a su...
| 出版年: | Filozofia |
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| 第一著者: | |
| フォーマット: | 論文 |
| 言語: | チェコ語 |
| 出版事項: |
Institute of Philosophy SAS, v.v.i.
2024-11-01
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| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | https://journals.savba.sk/index.php/filozofia/article/view/3396 |
| 要約: | The intuitively right answer to the question ‘What am I?’ is not ‘an incorporeal spirit’, but ‘a human being’. Aquinas reflects this common-sense view when he says that ‘the human is no mere soul, but a compound of soul and body.’ And Descartes, despite his notorious dualistic thesis that I am a substance that does not need anything material in order to exist, insists nevertheless that the human mind-body compound is a genuine unity in its own right, not a mere soul making using of a body. This paper argues for the enduring philosophical importance of this notion of our ‘compound’ nature as human beings, and explores its significance across three principal dimensions – the psychological, the phenomenological, and the moral.
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| ISSN: | 0046-385X 2585-7061 |