The Human Being as ‘Compound’: Aquinas versus Descartes on Human Nature

The intuitively right answer to the question ‘What am I?’ is not ‘an incorporeal spirit’, but ‘a human being’. Aquinas reflects this common-sense view when he says that ‘the human is no mere soul, but a compound of soul and body.’ And Descartes, despite his notorious dualistic thesis that I am a su...

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Published in:Filozofia
Main Author: John Cottingham
Format: Article
Language:Czech
Published: Institute of Philosophy SAS, v.v.i. 2024-11-01
Subjects:
Online Access:https://journals.savba.sk/index.php/filozofia/article/view/3396
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author John Cottingham
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description The intuitively right answer to the question ‘What am I?’ is not ‘an incorporeal spirit’, but ‘a human being’. Aquinas reflects this common-sense view when he says that ‘the human is no mere soul, but a compound of soul and body.’ And Descartes, despite his notorious dualistic thesis that I am a substance that does not need anything material in order to exist, insists nevertheless that the human mind-body compound is a genuine unity in its own right, not a mere soul making using of a body. This paper argues for the enduring philosophical importance of this notion of our ‘compound’ nature as human beings, and explores its significance across three principal dimensions – the psychological, the phenomenological, and the moral.
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spelling doaj-art-05973f8074fe454f8d45d5cd724ae8562025-08-19T23:28:42ZcesInstitute of Philosophy SAS, v.v.i.Filozofia0046-385X2585-70612024-11-0179910.31577/filozofia.2024.79.9.1The Human Being as ‘Compound’: Aquinas versus Descartes on Human NatureJohn Cottingham The intuitively right answer to the question ‘What am I?’ is not ‘an incorporeal spirit’, but ‘a human being’. Aquinas reflects this common-sense view when he says that ‘the human is no mere soul, but a compound of soul and body.’ And Descartes, despite his notorious dualistic thesis that I am a substance that does not need anything material in order to exist, insists nevertheless that the human mind-body compound is a genuine unity in its own right, not a mere soul making using of a body. This paper argues for the enduring philosophical importance of this notion of our ‘compound’ nature as human beings, and explores its significance across three principal dimensions – the psychological, the phenomenological, and the moral. https://journals.savba.sk/index.php/filozofia/article/view/3396AcquinasDescarteshuman beingsoulbodyAristotle
spellingShingle John Cottingham
The Human Being as ‘Compound’: Aquinas versus Descartes on Human Nature
Acquinas
Descartes
human being
soul
body
Aristotle
title The Human Being as ‘Compound’: Aquinas versus Descartes on Human Nature
title_full The Human Being as ‘Compound’: Aquinas versus Descartes on Human Nature
title_fullStr The Human Being as ‘Compound’: Aquinas versus Descartes on Human Nature
title_full_unstemmed The Human Being as ‘Compound’: Aquinas versus Descartes on Human Nature
title_short The Human Being as ‘Compound’: Aquinas versus Descartes on Human Nature
title_sort human being as compound aquinas versus descartes on human nature
topic Acquinas
Descartes
human being
soul
body
Aristotle
url https://journals.savba.sk/index.php/filozofia/article/view/3396
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