Coordination Games on Directed Graphs

We study natural strategic games on directed graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. We show that these games do not need to have a pure Nash equilibrium and that the problem of determining their existence is NP-complete. The same holds for strong...

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Published in:Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
Main Authors: Krzysztof R. Apt, Sunil Simon, Dominik Wojtczak
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Open Publishing Association 2016-06-01
Online Access:http://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.07517v1
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author Krzysztof R. Apt
Sunil Simon
Dominik Wojtczak
author_facet Krzysztof R. Apt
Sunil Simon
Dominik Wojtczak
author_sort Krzysztof R. Apt
collection DOAJ
container_title Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
description We study natural strategic games on directed graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. We show that these games do not need to have a pure Nash equilibrium and that the problem of determining their existence is NP-complete. The same holds for strong equilibria. We also exhibit some classes of games for which strong equilibria exist and prove that a strong equilibrium can then be found in linear time.
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spelling doaj-art-2cff6bb1aeb84ea7bfb59f06abdd0c192025-08-19T20:21:28ZengOpen Publishing AssociationElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science2075-21802016-06-01215Proc. TARK 2015678010.4204/EPTCS.215.6:50Coordination Games on Directed GraphsKrzysztof R. Apt0Sunil Simon1Dominik Wojtczak2 Centrum Wiskunde and Informatica, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Department of CSE, IIT Kanpur, Kanpur, India University of Liverpool, Liverpool, U.K. We study natural strategic games on directed graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. We show that these games do not need to have a pure Nash equilibrium and that the problem of determining their existence is NP-complete. The same holds for strong equilibria. We also exhibit some classes of games for which strong equilibria exist and prove that a strong equilibrium can then be found in linear time.http://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.07517v1
spellingShingle Krzysztof R. Apt
Sunil Simon
Dominik Wojtczak
Coordination Games on Directed Graphs
title Coordination Games on Directed Graphs
title_full Coordination Games on Directed Graphs
title_fullStr Coordination Games on Directed Graphs
title_full_unstemmed Coordination Games on Directed Graphs
title_short Coordination Games on Directed Graphs
title_sort coordination games on directed graphs
url http://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.07517v1
work_keys_str_mv AT krzysztofrapt coordinationgamesondirectedgraphs
AT sunilsimon coordinationgamesondirectedgraphs
AT dominikwojtczak coordinationgamesondirectedgraphs