VERBAL DISPUTES AND DEEP CONCEPTUAL DISAGREEMENTS
To say that a philosophical dispute is âmerely verbalâ seems to be an important diagnosis. If that diagnosis is correct for a particular dispute, then the right thing to do would be to declare that dispute to be over. The topic of what the disputing parties were fighting over was just a pseudo-probl...
| Published in: | Trames |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Estonian Academy Publishers
2020-08-01
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://kirj.ee/wp-content/plugins/kirj/pub/Trames-3-2020-279-294_20200827124452.pdf |
| Summary: | To say that a philosophical dispute is âmerely verbalâ seems to be an important diagnosis. If that diagnosis is correct for a particular dispute, then the right thing to do would be to declare that dispute to be over. The topic of what the disputing parties were fighting over was just a pseudo-problem (thus not really a problem), or at least â if there is a sense in which also merely verbal disputes indicate some problem, for example, insufficient clarity of terminology â this problem is not substantial, or not as substantial as the disputing parties believed their problem initially to be. In this paper I will try to clarify what it means if we diagnose that two arguing parties are having a merely verbal dispute. |
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| ISSN: | 1406-0922 1736-7514 |