Think or blink — is the recognition heuristic an “intuitive” strategy?
Several approaches to judgment and decision making emphasize the effort-reducing properties of heuristics. One prominent example for effort-reduction is the recognition heuristic (RH) which proposes that judgments are made by relying on one single cue (recognition), ignoring other information. Our r...
| Published in: | Judgment and Decision Making |
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2010-07-01
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500003533/type/journal_article |
| _version_ | 1850281523885899776 |
|---|---|
| author | Benjamin E. Hilbig Sabine G. Scholl Rüdiger F. Pohl Julian N. Marewski Rüdiger F. Pohl Oliver Vitouch |
| author_facet | Benjamin E. Hilbig Sabine G. Scholl Rüdiger F. Pohl Julian N. Marewski Rüdiger F. Pohl Oliver Vitouch |
| author_sort | Benjamin E. Hilbig |
| collection | DOAJ |
| container_title | Judgment and Decision Making |
| description | Several approaches to judgment and decision making emphasize the effort-reducing properties of heuristics. One prominent example for effort-reduction is the recognition heuristic (RH) which proposes that judgments are made by relying on one single cue (recognition), ignoring other information. Our research aims to shed light on the conditions under which the RH is more useful and thus relied on more often. We propose that intuitive thinking is fast, automatic, and effortless whereas deliberative thinking is slower, stepwise, and more effortful. Because effort-reduction is thus much more important when processing information deliberately, we hypothesize that the RH should be more often relied on in such situations. In two city-size-experiments, we instructed participants to think either intuitively or deliberatively and assessed use of the RH through a formal measurement model. Results revealed that, in both experiments, use of the RH was more likely when judgments were to be made deliberatively, rather than intuitively. As such, we conclude that the potential application of heuristics is not necessarily a consequence of “intuitive” processing. Rather, their effort-reducing features are probably most beneficial when thinking more deliberatively. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-cf9d7b5e2afa4a00a92bff22c781653d |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Journals |
| issn | 1930-2975 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2010-07-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| spelling | doaj-art-cf9d7b5e2afa4a00a92bff22c781653d2025-08-19T23:38:53ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752010-07-01530030910.1017/S1930297500003533Think or blink — is the recognition heuristic an “intuitive” strategy?Benjamin E. Hilbig0Sabine G. Scholl1Rüdiger F. Pohl2Julian N. MarewskiRüdiger F. PohlOliver VitouchUniversity of Mannheim and Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective GoodsUniversity of MannheimUniversity of MannheimSeveral approaches to judgment and decision making emphasize the effort-reducing properties of heuristics. One prominent example for effort-reduction is the recognition heuristic (RH) which proposes that judgments are made by relying on one single cue (recognition), ignoring other information. Our research aims to shed light on the conditions under which the RH is more useful and thus relied on more often. We propose that intuitive thinking is fast, automatic, and effortless whereas deliberative thinking is slower, stepwise, and more effortful. Because effort-reduction is thus much more important when processing information deliberately, we hypothesize that the RH should be more often relied on in such situations. In two city-size-experiments, we instructed participants to think either intuitively or deliberatively and assessed use of the RH through a formal measurement model. Results revealed that, in both experiments, use of the RH was more likely when judgments were to be made deliberatively, rather than intuitively. As such, we conclude that the potential application of heuristics is not necessarily a consequence of “intuitive” processing. Rather, their effort-reducing features are probably most beneficial when thinking more deliberatively.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500003533/type/journal_articleeffort-reductionintuitiondeliberationheuristicsrecognition heuristiccomparative judgmentsmultinomial processing tree model |
| spellingShingle | Benjamin E. Hilbig Sabine G. Scholl Rüdiger F. Pohl Julian N. Marewski Rüdiger F. Pohl Oliver Vitouch Think or blink — is the recognition heuristic an “intuitive” strategy? effort-reduction intuition deliberation heuristics recognition heuristic comparative judgments multinomial processing tree model |
| title | Think or blink — is the recognition heuristic an “intuitive” strategy? |
| title_full | Think or blink — is the recognition heuristic an “intuitive” strategy? |
| title_fullStr | Think or blink — is the recognition heuristic an “intuitive” strategy? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Think or blink — is the recognition heuristic an “intuitive” strategy? |
| title_short | Think or blink — is the recognition heuristic an “intuitive” strategy? |
| title_sort | think or blink is the recognition heuristic an intuitive strategy |
| topic | effort-reduction intuition deliberation heuristics recognition heuristic comparative judgments multinomial processing tree model |
| url | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500003533/type/journal_article |
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