A Review of Multi-Agent Game in Intellectual Property Pledge Financing

• Published in: Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response (JRACR)
• Main Author: Chang Guo
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Society for Risk Analysis - China 2024-06-01
• Subjects: intellectual property; intellectual property pledge financing; multi-agent game; evolutionary game; signaling game; literature review
• Online Access: https://doi.org/10.54560/jracr.v14i2.473

To promote the theoretical research and business development of intellectual property pledge financing, this paper summarizes the research status of multi-agent game in intellectual property pledge financing. At present, scholars’ research on multi-agent game in intellectual property pledge financing mainly focuses on the game between borrowers and lenders, the game between lenders and third-party intermediaries (or platforms), and the game between borrowers, lenders and third-party intermediaries (or platforms). Overall, scholars have conducted extensive research on the game between borrowers and lenders, while research on the game between borrowers, lenders, and third-party intermediaries (or platforms) is relatively weak. Especially when the government implements financial subsidies and interest subsidies for borrowers, financial subsidies for third-party intermediaries (or platforms), and risk compensation for lenders, there is a lack of research on the intellectual property pledge financing game with the government as an independent game subject. Future research can focus on the game between borrowers, lenders, and the government under government incentives, as well as the game between borrowers, lenders, third-party intermediaries (or platforms) and the government under government incentives.