Metaphysical stuctures and holism: Reply to Schaffer
This paper deals with Schaffer’s distinction between metaphysical structures, as well as his appeal for the revival of neo-Aristotelian approaches that imply ordered structure, based on the criticism of Quine’s method that, in his view, implies flat metaphysical structure. However, although...
| 發表在: | Filozofija i Društvo |
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| 主要作者: | |
| 格式: | Article |
| 語言: | 德语 |
| 出版: |
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade
2025-01-01
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2025/0353-57382503761B.pdf |
| 總結: | This paper deals with Schaffer’s distinction between metaphysical structures,
as well as his appeal for the revival of neo-Aristotelian approaches that
imply ordered structure, based on the criticism of Quine’s method that, in
his view, implies flat metaphysical structure. However, although I believe
that Schaffer’s distinction between metaphysical structures is an
interesting and, basically, acceptable view, I will try to show that
Schaffer’s arguments are not convincing enough to persuade us to abandon
Quine’s method and adopt the Aristotelian metaphysical model. Moreover, when
mistakes that Schaffer makes are corrected and Quine’s method is given due
attention, we will see that this can enable us to have a more tenable
interpretation of the concepts that Schaffer speaks of (metaphysical
structures), but also - as in his case - to draw certain conclusions that go
beyond the objectives of classification as such. |
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| ISSN: | 0353-5738 2334-8577 |