Stability Analysis of Innovation Collaboration between Commercial Banks and Fintech Companies

• Published in: Mathematics
• Main Authors: Ying Fang, Guofeng Wen
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: MDPI AG 2024-08-01
• Subjects: innovation collaboration; fintech companies; commercial banks; evolutionary game; prospect theory
• Online Access: https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/12/17/2724

Recently, there has been an increasing trend among commercial banks to collaborate with fintech companies in order to promote corporate innovation. However, due to the uncertainty and turbulence of the business environment, it is difficult for the collaborators to generate full trust to integrate knowledge and resources. Innovation collaboration often suffers from instability. The objective of this study is to identify the factors that influence the stability of innovation collaboration and clarify the path of collaboration evolution. Based on prospect theory and evolutionary game theory, this study first establishes an evolutionary game model between commercial banks and fintech companies (fintechs), and analyses the factors influencing the stability of their collaboration. The findings indicate that the benefits and costs of innovation collaboration, the fairness of income distribution, the complementarity of knowledge and technology, the synergy of collaboration, and the perceived value of gains and losses by partners all influence the stability of innovation collaboration. This study’s findings provide valuable guidance for banks and fintech companies to balance the benefits and costs of collaboration and improve the stability of collaboration. In the future, the government will be considered as a new game player, and bilateral relations will be considered as a new mode of collaboration in studying the stability of innovation collaboration.