Contingent A Priori Truths, Illocutionary Acts, and De Re Knowledge

In this paper, I analyze Ruffino’s proposal that we should evaluate contingent a priori truths resulting from initial baptisms (i.e., propositions that are uttered to introduce of a new word to a community’s vocabulary) as illocutionary acts. I argue that, even if we concede such an interpretation...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Crítica
Main Author: Thainá Coltro Demartini
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) 2025-09-01
Subjects:
speech acts
semantics
institutional facts
declaratives
epistemology
Online Access:https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1703
Description
Summary:In this paper, I analyze Ruffino’s proposal that we should evaluate contingent a priori truths resulting from initial baptisms (i.e., propositions that are uttered to introduce of a new word to a community’s vocabulary) as illocutionary acts. I argue that, even if we concede such an interpretation as the correct way to understand the phenomenon, it is not sufficient to support the claim that there are cases of contingent a priori truths that provide the speaker with de re knowledge about objects that are not themselves conventional in some way.
ISSN:0011-1503
1870-4905

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