Fine-grained address space layout randomization on program load
Program vulnerabilities are a serious security threat. It is important to develop defenses preventing their exploitation, especially with a rapid increase of ROP attacks. State of the art defenses have some drawbacks that can be used by attackers. In this paper we propose fine-grained address space...
| 发表在: | Труды Института системного программирования РАН |
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
| 格式: | 文件 |
| 语言: | 英语 |
| 出版: |
Russian Academy of Sciences, Ivannikov Institute for System Programming
2018-10-01
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| 主题: | |
| 在线阅读: | https://ispranproceedings.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/424 |
| _version_ | 1848652022353494016 |
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| author | A. R. Nurmukhametov E. A. Zhabotinskiy Sh. F. Kurmangaleev S. S. Gaissaryan A. V. Vishnyakov |
| author_facet | A. R. Nurmukhametov E. A. Zhabotinskiy Sh. F. Kurmangaleev S. S. Gaissaryan A. V. Vishnyakov |
| author_sort | A. R. Nurmukhametov |
| collection | DOAJ |
| container_title | Труды Института системного программирования РАН |
| description | Program vulnerabilities are a serious security threat. It is important to develop defenses preventing their exploitation, especially with a rapid increase of ROP attacks. State of the art defenses have some drawbacks that can be used by attackers. In this paper we propose fine-grained address space layout randomization on program load that is able to protect from such kind of attacks. During the static linking stage executable and library files are supplemented with information about function boundaries and relocations. A system dynamic linker/loader uses this information to perform functions permutation. The proposed method was implemented for 64-bit programs on CentOS 7 operating system. The implemented method has shown good resistance to ROP attacks based on two metrics: the number of survived gadgets and the exploitability estimation of ROP chain examples. The implementation presented in this article is applicable across the entire operating system and has shown 1.5 % time overhead. The working capacity of proposed approach was demonstrated on real programs. The further research can cover forking randomization and finer granularity than on the function level. It also makes sense to implement the randomization of short functions placement, taking into account the relationships between them. The close arrangement of functions that often call each other can improve the performance of individual programs. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-dbcd722a328f4ffd89fc91b701f552e7 |
| institution | Directory of Open Access Journals |
| issn | 2079-8156 2220-6426 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2018-10-01 |
| publisher | Russian Academy of Sciences, Ivannikov Institute for System Programming |
| record_format | Article |
| spelling | doaj-dbcd722a328f4ffd89fc91b701f552e72025-11-02T23:36:41ZengRussian Academy of Sciences, Ivannikov Institute for System ProgrammingТруды Института системного программирования РАН2079-81562220-64262018-10-0129616318210.15514/ISPRAS-2017-29(6)-9424Fine-grained address space layout randomization on program loadA. R. Nurmukhametov0E. A. Zhabotinskiy1Sh. F. Kurmangaleev2S. S. Gaissaryan3A. V. Vishnyakov4Институт системного программирования им. В.П. Иванникова РАНИнститут системного программирования им. В.П. Иванникова РАНИнститут системного программирования им. В.П. Иванникова РАНИнститут системного программирования им. В.П. Иванникова РАН; МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова, 2-й учебный корпус, факультет ВМК; Московский физико-технический институт; Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»Институт системного программирования им. В.П. Иванникова РАНProgram vulnerabilities are a serious security threat. It is important to develop defenses preventing their exploitation, especially with a rapid increase of ROP attacks. State of the art defenses have some drawbacks that can be used by attackers. In this paper we propose fine-grained address space layout randomization on program load that is able to protect from such kind of attacks. During the static linking stage executable and library files are supplemented with information about function boundaries and relocations. A system dynamic linker/loader uses this information to perform functions permutation. The proposed method was implemented for 64-bit programs on CentOS 7 operating system. The implemented method has shown good resistance to ROP attacks based on two metrics: the number of survived gadgets and the exploitability estimation of ROP chain examples. The implementation presented in this article is applicable across the entire operating system and has shown 1.5 % time overhead. The working capacity of proposed approach was demonstrated on real programs. The further research can cover forking randomization and finer granularity than on the function level. It also makes sense to implement the randomization of short functions placement, taking into account the relationships between them. The close arrangement of functions that often call each other can improve the performance of individual programs.https://ispranproceedings.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/424рандомизация адресного пространствадиверсификацияaslrrop |
| spellingShingle | A. R. Nurmukhametov E. A. Zhabotinskiy Sh. F. Kurmangaleev S. S. Gaissaryan A. V. Vishnyakov Fine-grained address space layout randomization on program load рандомизация адресного пространства диверсификация aslr rop |
| title | Fine-grained address space layout randomization on program load |
| title_full | Fine-grained address space layout randomization on program load |
| title_fullStr | Fine-grained address space layout randomization on program load |
| title_full_unstemmed | Fine-grained address space layout randomization on program load |
| title_short | Fine-grained address space layout randomization on program load |
| title_sort | fine grained address space layout randomization on program load |
| topic | рандомизация адресного пространства диверсификация aslr rop |
| url | https://ispranproceedings.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/424 |
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