Panpsychism: A Meta-View in the Philosophy of Mind
In this article, my aim is to present panpsychism as a meta-view in the philosophy of mind rather than as a position that can be juxtaposed with leading positions such as materialism and dualism. I argue here that proponents of some versions of dualism, dual-aspect theory, some non-standard forms of...
| Published in: | Organon F |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
2024-08-01
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/0908091610.31577:orgf.2024.31304.pdf |
| Summary: | In this article, my aim is to present panpsychism as a meta-view in the philosophy of mind rather than as a position that can be juxtaposed with leading positions such as materialism and dualism. I argue here that proponents of some versions of dualism, dual-aspect theory, some non-standard forms of physicalism, or idealism may be guided by the assumptions of panpsychism as a meta-view. For example, the literature includes positions such as Chalmers’ naturalistic dualism, Strawson’s physicalist panpsychism, and Sprigge’s idealist panpsychism, along with Nagel’s remarks on dual-aspect theory. I argue that panpsychism, as a meta-view, provides a framework within which to analyze how these positions address the mind-body problem. Consequently, I conclude that the solution to the mind-body problem itself remains neutral toward these positions. Instead of focusing on the elaboration of these metaphysical positions, attention should be directed toward the crucial issue for panpsychism: the combination problem. |
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| ISSN: | 1335-0668 2585-7150 |