The Human Being as ‘Compound’: Aquinas versus Descartes on Human Nature

The intuitively right answer to the question ‘What am I?’ is not ‘an incorporeal spirit’, but ‘a human being’. Aquinas reflects this common-sense view when he says that ‘the human is no mere soul, but a compound of soul and body.’ And Descartes, despite his notorious dualistic thesis that I am a su...

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書目詳細資料
發表在:Filozofia
主要作者: John Cottingham
格式: Article
語言:捷克语
出版: Institute of Philosophy SAS, v.v.i. 2024-11-01
主題:
在線閱讀:https://journals.savba.sk/index.php/filozofia/article/view/3396
實物特徵
總結:The intuitively right answer to the question ‘What am I?’ is not ‘an incorporeal spirit’, but ‘a human being’. Aquinas reflects this common-sense view when he says that ‘the human is no mere soul, but a compound of soul and body.’ And Descartes, despite his notorious dualistic thesis that I am a substance that does not need anything material in order to exist, insists nevertheless that the human mind-body compound is a genuine unity in its own right, not a mere soul making using of a body. This paper argues for the enduring philosophical importance of this notion of our ‘compound’ nature as human beings, and explores its significance across three principal dimensions – the psychological, the phenomenological, and the moral.
ISSN:0046-385X
2585-7061