Evolutionary game and simulation analysis on quality supervision of low-carbon renovation of high-carbon emission enterprises under the reward and punishment mechanism

From the perspective of multi-stakeholders, considering the rent-seeking phenomenon existing in the inspection and acceptance of low-carbon renovation under the government’s reward and punishment mechanism, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, third-party tes...

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Bibliographic Details

Published in:	Frontiers in Environmental Science
Main Authors:	Xiangjian Weng, Chunhui Yuan, Qihang Hu, Yuhe Xu
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Published:	Frontiers Media S.A. 2023-05-01
Subjects:	low-carbon renovation quality supervision rent-seeking tripartite evolutionary game reward and punishment mechanism
Online Access:	https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenvs.2023.1126275/full