Governance as a Candidate System Regulator: How Institutional Quality Shapes Capital Efficiency in Oil-Dependent Economies

Oil-dependent economies function as complex socio-economic systems in which resource revenues, institutional structures, and investment outcomes are dynamically interlinked. When governance is weak, oil windfalls can trigger reinforcing feedback loops that erode institutional capacity, reduce invest...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Published in:Systems
Main Author: Nagwa Amin Abdelkawy
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2026-05-01
Subjects:
complex socio-economic systems
feedback loops
governance
oil rents
investment efficiency
ICOR
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/14/5/542

Internet

https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/14/5/542

Similar Items