Traffic Analysis Through Spatial and Temporal Correlation: Threat and Countermeasure

The base station (BS) in a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) plays the role of a data sink, a point of contact with the upper hierarchy, and an in-situ command and control unit. Such an essential role makes the BS a target for attacks in a hostile environment. Even if its presence is camouflaged, an adv...

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Main Authors: Yousef Ebrahimi, Mohamed Younis
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: IEEE 2021-01-01
Series:IEEE Access
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9395094/
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spelling doaj-013ce10cc7cb4c989e99b17652ad41592021-04-12T23:00:25ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362021-01-019541265415110.1109/ACCESS.2021.30708419395094Traffic Analysis Through Spatial and Temporal Correlation: Threat and CountermeasureYousef Ebrahimi0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3830-7791Mohamed Younis1https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3865-9217Department of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, University of Maryland Baltimore County, Baltimore, MD, USADepartment of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, University of Maryland Baltimore County, Baltimore, MD, USAThe base station (BS) in a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) plays the role of a data sink, a point of contact with the upper hierarchy, and an in-situ command and control unit. Such an essential role makes the BS a target for attacks in a hostile environment. Even if its presence is camouflaged, an adversary may locate the BS by applying traffic analysis. Basically, the adversary can intercept radio transmissions and correlate them using techniques like Evidence theory (ET). The ET attack model only uses spatial aspects of intercepted transmissions in order to deduce knowledge about data routes. In this paper, we propose an enhanced version of ET (EET) which utilizes temporal correlation of transmissions to draw further valuable insight about the network topology. Analyzing ET and extending its capability are very fundamental for the network in order to avoid the illusive sense of security by guarding against a weaker attack model than what could be potentially launched. Moreover, we develop a novel and effective countermeasure, called Assisted Deception (AD) that needs no involvement of BS and is resilient to both ET and EET. By implementing AD, nodes coordinate and inject timed deceptive packets to target temporal correlation of consecutive transmissions that EET relies on. The attack and countermeasure are validated through extensive simulation experiments.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9395094/Anonymityevidence theorylocation privacytraffic analysiswireless sensor networks
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Yousef Ebrahimi
Mohamed Younis
spellingShingle Yousef Ebrahimi
Mohamed Younis
Traffic Analysis Through Spatial and Temporal Correlation: Threat and Countermeasure
IEEE Access
Anonymity
evidence theory
location privacy
traffic analysis
wireless sensor networks
author_facet Yousef Ebrahimi
Mohamed Younis
author_sort Yousef Ebrahimi
title Traffic Analysis Through Spatial and Temporal Correlation: Threat and Countermeasure
title_short Traffic Analysis Through Spatial and Temporal Correlation: Threat and Countermeasure
title_full Traffic Analysis Through Spatial and Temporal Correlation: Threat and Countermeasure
title_fullStr Traffic Analysis Through Spatial and Temporal Correlation: Threat and Countermeasure
title_full_unstemmed Traffic Analysis Through Spatial and Temporal Correlation: Threat and Countermeasure
title_sort traffic analysis through spatial and temporal correlation: threat and countermeasure
publisher IEEE
series IEEE Access
issn 2169-3536
publishDate 2021-01-01
description The base station (BS) in a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) plays the role of a data sink, a point of contact with the upper hierarchy, and an in-situ command and control unit. Such an essential role makes the BS a target for attacks in a hostile environment. Even if its presence is camouflaged, an adversary may locate the BS by applying traffic analysis. Basically, the adversary can intercept radio transmissions and correlate them using techniques like Evidence theory (ET). The ET attack model only uses spatial aspects of intercepted transmissions in order to deduce knowledge about data routes. In this paper, we propose an enhanced version of ET (EET) which utilizes temporal correlation of transmissions to draw further valuable insight about the network topology. Analyzing ET and extending its capability are very fundamental for the network in order to avoid the illusive sense of security by guarding against a weaker attack model than what could be potentially launched. Moreover, we develop a novel and effective countermeasure, called Assisted Deception (AD) that needs no involvement of BS and is resilient to both ET and EET. By implementing AD, nodes coordinate and inject timed deceptive packets to target temporal correlation of consecutive transmissions that EET relies on. The attack and countermeasure are validated through extensive simulation experiments.
topic Anonymity
evidence theory
location privacy
traffic analysis
wireless sensor networks
url https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9395094/
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