| Summary: | Although Peirce wrote about the concept of information in various contexts, his use of the term can only be vaguely related to its modern meaning. In the paper an attempt is made to interpret the concept of information in terms of the Peircean concept of sign. It is argued, moreover, that the concept of sign must be compÍemented by the concept of sign-event. In the first part, it is argued why a metaphysics of events has greater merits than the traditional metaphysics of substance and the modern metaphysics of fact. An attempt is made to distinguish the basic features of events. In the
second part, it is shown that the concept of 'information' allows for an interpretation in which events and information are intrinsically related to one another. There is no event without information, and there is no information that is not event-like. In the third part, an attempt is made to apply the Peircean analysis of signs to information understood in the way that was defended in the second part. In conclusion, a case may be made for the potentially fundamental relevance of the concept of 'information' for a metaphysics of events.
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