Adversariality and Argumentation

The concept of adversariality, like that of argument, admits of significant variation. As a consequence, I argue, the question of adversarial argument has not been well understood. After defining adversariality, I argue that if we take argument to be about beliefs, rather than commitments, then two...

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Main Author: John Casey
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Windsor 2020-02-01
Series:Informal Logic
Online Access:https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/5969
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spelling doaj-07cbd5555768494fa9d9257705d3328d2020-11-25T02:23:45ZengUniversity of WindsorInformal Logic0824-25772293-734X2020-02-0140110.22329/il.v40i1.5969Adversariality and ArgumentationJohn CaseyThe concept of adversariality, like that of argument, admits of significant variation. As a consequence, I argue, the question of adversarial argument has not been well understood. After defining adversariality, I argue that if we take argument to be about beliefs, rather than commitments, then two considerations show that adversariality is an essential part of it. First, beliefs are not under our direct voluntary control. Second, beliefs are costly both for the psychological states they provoke and for the fact that they are causally related to our actions. As a result, argument involving agreement can also be understood to be adversarial. https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/5969
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author John Casey
spellingShingle John Casey
Adversariality and Argumentation
Informal Logic
author_facet John Casey
author_sort John Casey
title Adversariality and Argumentation
title_short Adversariality and Argumentation
title_full Adversariality and Argumentation
title_fullStr Adversariality and Argumentation
title_full_unstemmed Adversariality and Argumentation
title_sort adversariality and argumentation
publisher University of Windsor
series Informal Logic
issn 0824-2577
2293-734X
publishDate 2020-02-01
description The concept of adversariality, like that of argument, admits of significant variation. As a consequence, I argue, the question of adversarial argument has not been well understood. After defining adversariality, I argue that if we take argument to be about beliefs, rather than commitments, then two considerations show that adversariality is an essential part of it. First, beliefs are not under our direct voluntary control. Second, beliefs are costly both for the psychological states they provoke and for the fact that they are causally related to our actions. As a result, argument involving agreement can also be understood to be adversarial.
url https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/5969
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