Replicating different roles of intent across moral domains

Whether moral cognition is underpinned by distinct mental systems that process different domains of moral information (moral pluralism) is an important question for moral cognition research. The reduced importance of intent (intentional versus accidental action) when judging purity (e.g. incest), wh...

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Main Authors: Joseph Sweetman, George A. Newman
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: The Royal Society 2020-05-01
Series:Royal Society Open Science
Subjects:
Online Access:https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsos.190808
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spelling doaj-08ca7a5c05464dc7865a86dc151dba942020-11-25T04:04:21ZengThe Royal SocietyRoyal Society Open Science2054-57032020-05-017510.1098/rsos.190808190808Replicating different roles of intent across moral domainsJoseph SweetmanGeorge A. NewmanWhether moral cognition is underpinned by distinct mental systems that process different domains of moral information (moral pluralism) is an important question for moral cognition research. The reduced importance of intent (intentional versus accidental action) when judging purity (e.g. incest), when compared with harm (e.g. poisoning), moral violations is, arguably, some of the strongest experimental evidence for distinct moral systems or ‘foundations’. The experiment presented here is a replication attempt of these experimental findings. A pre-registered replication of Experiment 1B from the original article documenting this effect was conducted in a sample of N = 400 participants. Findings from this successful replication are discussed in terms of theoretical and methodological implications for approaches to moral cognition.https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsos.190808moralitymoral domainsintentpurityharmtheory of mind
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Joseph Sweetman
George A. Newman
spellingShingle Joseph Sweetman
George A. Newman
Replicating different roles of intent across moral domains
Royal Society Open Science
morality
moral domains
intent
purity
harm
theory of mind
author_facet Joseph Sweetman
George A. Newman
author_sort Joseph Sweetman
title Replicating different roles of intent across moral domains
title_short Replicating different roles of intent across moral domains
title_full Replicating different roles of intent across moral domains
title_fullStr Replicating different roles of intent across moral domains
title_full_unstemmed Replicating different roles of intent across moral domains
title_sort replicating different roles of intent across moral domains
publisher The Royal Society
series Royal Society Open Science
issn 2054-5703
publishDate 2020-05-01
description Whether moral cognition is underpinned by distinct mental systems that process different domains of moral information (moral pluralism) is an important question for moral cognition research. The reduced importance of intent (intentional versus accidental action) when judging purity (e.g. incest), when compared with harm (e.g. poisoning), moral violations is, arguably, some of the strongest experimental evidence for distinct moral systems or ‘foundations’. The experiment presented here is a replication attempt of these experimental findings. A pre-registered replication of Experiment 1B from the original article documenting this effect was conducted in a sample of N = 400 participants. Findings from this successful replication are discussed in terms of theoretical and methodological implications for approaches to moral cognition.
topic morality
moral domains
intent
purity
harm
theory of mind
url https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsos.190808
work_keys_str_mv AT josephsweetman replicatingdifferentrolesofintentacrossmoraldomains
AT georgeanewman replicatingdifferentrolesofintentacrossmoraldomains
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