An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China

An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China

Public information is a social resource that connects all aspects of social life, regulates social activities and public behaviors, and plays a very important role in influencing public trust. Based on the perspective of communication, we divide the government into two ways to release public informa...

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Main Authors: Hongsen Luo, Ying Gao, Fulei Shi
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Hindawi-Wiley 2021-01-01
Series:Complexity
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8956704
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spelling doaj-0cfa91415f2640c79bbda05fceff16532021-02-15T12:52:50ZengHindawi-WileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262021-01-01202110.1155/2021/89567048956704An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in ChinaHongsen Luo0Ying Gao1Fulei Shi2School of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing, ChinaSchool of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing, ChinaSchool of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing, ChinaPublic information is a social resource that connects all aspects of social life, regulates social activities and public behaviors, and plays a very important role in influencing public trust. Based on the perspective of communication, we divide the government into two ways to release public information, that is, mass communication and personalized recommendation. Moreover, the public can choose to acquire or not acquire a strategy. Then, this study conducts an evolutionary game between the government and the public to analyze the influence of public information on the public in China. Our objective is to find how the evolutionary path changes between the two players when strategies are changing. Then, a simulation analysis is presented in six scenarios to illustrate the results. The results show that the two players can converge to different stable statuses under different situations.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8956704
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Hongsen Luo
Ying Gao
Fulei Shi
spellingShingle Hongsen Luo
Ying Gao
Fulei Shi
An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China
Complexity
author_facet Hongsen Luo
Ying Gao
Fulei Shi
author_sort Hongsen Luo
title An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China
title_short An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China
title_full An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China
title_fullStr An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China
title_full_unstemmed An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China
title_sort evolutionary game analysis on public information communication between the government and the public in china
publisher Hindawi-Wiley
series Complexity
issn 1076-2787
1099-0526
publishDate 2021-01-01
description Public information is a social resource that connects all aspects of social life, regulates social activities and public behaviors, and plays a very important role in influencing public trust. Based on the perspective of communication, we divide the government into two ways to release public information, that is, mass communication and personalized recommendation. Moreover, the public can choose to acquire or not acquire a strategy. Then, this study conducts an evolutionary game between the government and the public to analyze the influence of public information on the public in China. Our objective is to find how the evolutionary path changes between the two players when strategies are changing. Then, a simulation analysis is presented in six scenarios to illustrate the results. The results show that the two players can converge to different stable statuses under different situations.
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8956704
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