Evolution Model of Health Food Safety Risk Based on Prospect Theory
In the growing market of health food, certain disturbances occur, such as uneven quality of products, imitation of health food, prohibited drug content in health food, functional efficacy, and actual disagreement. The safety of health food has attracted wide attention from all walks of life. In this...
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doaj-0f6dceb0997248babae28eeee59947202020-11-25T00:38:52ZengHindawi LimitedJournal of Healthcare Engineering2040-22952040-23092018-01-01201810.1155/2018/87695638769563Evolution Model of Health Food Safety Risk Based on Prospect TheoryJun Luo0Baichao Ma1Yongle Zhao2Tingqiang Chen3School of Health Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Chinese Medicine, Nanjing, ChinaSchool of Business, Nankai University, Tianjin, ChinaBusiness School, Hohai University, Nanjing, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Nanjing Tech University, Nanjing, ChinaIn the growing market of health food, certain disturbances occur, such as uneven quality of products, imitation of health food, prohibited drug content in health food, functional efficacy, and actual disagreement. The safety of health food has attracted wide attention from all walks of life. In this study, we constructed a three-party game model of health food safety risk evolution, which includes health food enterprises, health food consumers, and government regulators, based on prospect theory and evolutionary game method. We also consider the attributes of “trust products” of health food, the ability to identify the safety information of health food, the subjective perception of the efficacy of health food, and the certification effect of the regulatory information of the government supervision department. The influence mechanism of these factors, including the cost of searching for health food information, consumers’ subjective perception of health food efficiency, and the certification effect of supervision departments, on health food safety risk evolution is described using theoretical deduction and simulation analysis. On this basis, the corresponding conclusions are established, which provide a theoretical basis for further exploration of the strategy of health food market governance.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/8769563 |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Jun Luo Baichao Ma Yongle Zhao Tingqiang Chen |
spellingShingle |
Jun Luo Baichao Ma Yongle Zhao Tingqiang Chen Evolution Model of Health Food Safety Risk Based on Prospect Theory Journal of Healthcare Engineering |
author_facet |
Jun Luo Baichao Ma Yongle Zhao Tingqiang Chen |
author_sort |
Jun Luo |
title |
Evolution Model of Health Food Safety Risk Based on Prospect Theory |
title_short |
Evolution Model of Health Food Safety Risk Based on Prospect Theory |
title_full |
Evolution Model of Health Food Safety Risk Based on Prospect Theory |
title_fullStr |
Evolution Model of Health Food Safety Risk Based on Prospect Theory |
title_full_unstemmed |
Evolution Model of Health Food Safety Risk Based on Prospect Theory |
title_sort |
evolution model of health food safety risk based on prospect theory |
publisher |
Hindawi Limited |
series |
Journal of Healthcare Engineering |
issn |
2040-2295 2040-2309 |
publishDate |
2018-01-01 |
description |
In the growing market of health food, certain disturbances occur, such as uneven quality of products, imitation of health food, prohibited drug content in health food, functional efficacy, and actual disagreement. The safety of health food has attracted wide attention from all walks of life. In this study, we constructed a three-party game model of health food safety risk evolution, which includes health food enterprises, health food consumers, and government regulators, based on prospect theory and evolutionary game method. We also consider the attributes of “trust products” of health food, the ability to identify the safety information of health food, the subjective perception of the efficacy of health food, and the certification effect of the regulatory information of the government supervision department. The influence mechanism of these factors, including the cost of searching for health food information, consumers’ subjective perception of health food efficiency, and the certification effect of supervision departments, on health food safety risk evolution is described using theoretical deduction and simulation analysis. On this basis, the corresponding conclusions are established, which provide a theoretical basis for further exploration of the strategy of health food market governance. |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/8769563 |
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