Good Corporate Governance: Firm Performance and Ownership Causality Test

Ownership structure, among other things, is one mechanism in corporate governance. In this context, ownership has a monitoring function. Another corporate governance mechanism is the market for corporate control. If managers did not act in the best interest of shareholder, then firm performance will...

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Main Authors: Tri Gunarsih, Setiyono Setiyono, Fran Sayekti, Tamas Novak
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universitas Merdeka Malang 2018-10-01
Series:Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan
Subjects:
Online Access:http://jurnal.unmer.ac.id/index.php/jkdp/article/view/2469
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spelling doaj-0fb89abbe1174bda8dc8abae2261749d2020-11-24T22:22:16ZengUniversitas Merdeka MalangJurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan1410-80892443-26872018-10-0122467067910.26905/jkdp.v22i4.2469Good Corporate Governance: Firm Performance and Ownership Causality TestTri Gunarsih, Setiyono Setiyono0Fran Sayekti1Tamas Novak2Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics, Universitas Teknologi Yogyakarta Jl. Siliwangi, Ring Road Utara, Sleman, Yogyakarta, 55285, IndonesiaDepartment of Accounting, Faculty of Economics, Universitas Teknologi Yogyakarta Jl. Siliwangi, Ring Road Utara, Sleman, Yogyakarta, 55285, IndonesiaBudapest Business School H-1051 Budapest, Marko Street 29-31, HungaryOwnership structure, among other things, is one mechanism in corporate governance. In this context, ownership has a monitoring function. Another corporate governance mechanism is the market for corporate control. If managers did not act in the best interest of shareholder, then firm performance will decrease. The changing in ownership will follow the decreasing of firm performance. This will raise an interesting question, whether ownership caused by firm performance or vice versa. The objectives of this study to test whether monitoring function or market for corporate control that was implemented as a corporate governance mechanism in Indonesia using causality model. A panel Granger-causality test base on Ganger (1969) applied to test the causality. Samples in this study were manufacture listed companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2012-2016. Ownership concentration was proxy by the Herfindahl Index of Domestic Institution ownership. The firm performance indicators in this study were efficiency, measured by Operating cost to Sales ratio, and Sales to Asset ratio and Tobin’s Q. The results of the study showed that there was a bi-causality relationship between ownership concentration and both firm performance indicators. These suggested that the monitoring function and the market for corporate control were implemented as a corporate governance mechanism in Indonesia. http://jurnal.unmer.ac.id/index.php/jkdp/article/view/2469CausalityCorporate GovernanceFirm PerformanceOwnership Structure
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Tri Gunarsih, Setiyono Setiyono
Fran Sayekti
Tamas Novak
spellingShingle Tri Gunarsih, Setiyono Setiyono
Fran Sayekti
Tamas Novak
Good Corporate Governance: Firm Performance and Ownership Causality Test
Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan
Causality
Corporate Governance
Firm Performance
Ownership Structure
author_facet Tri Gunarsih, Setiyono Setiyono
Fran Sayekti
Tamas Novak
author_sort Tri Gunarsih, Setiyono Setiyono
title Good Corporate Governance: Firm Performance and Ownership Causality Test
title_short Good Corporate Governance: Firm Performance and Ownership Causality Test
title_full Good Corporate Governance: Firm Performance and Ownership Causality Test
title_fullStr Good Corporate Governance: Firm Performance and Ownership Causality Test
title_full_unstemmed Good Corporate Governance: Firm Performance and Ownership Causality Test
title_sort good corporate governance: firm performance and ownership causality test
publisher Universitas Merdeka Malang
series Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan
issn 1410-8089
2443-2687
publishDate 2018-10-01
description Ownership structure, among other things, is one mechanism in corporate governance. In this context, ownership has a monitoring function. Another corporate governance mechanism is the market for corporate control. If managers did not act in the best interest of shareholder, then firm performance will decrease. The changing in ownership will follow the decreasing of firm performance. This will raise an interesting question, whether ownership caused by firm performance or vice versa. The objectives of this study to test whether monitoring function or market for corporate control that was implemented as a corporate governance mechanism in Indonesia using causality model. A panel Granger-causality test base on Ganger (1969) applied to test the causality. Samples in this study were manufacture listed companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2012-2016. Ownership concentration was proxy by the Herfindahl Index of Domestic Institution ownership. The firm performance indicators in this study were efficiency, measured by Operating cost to Sales ratio, and Sales to Asset ratio and Tobin’s Q. The results of the study showed that there was a bi-causality relationship between ownership concentration and both firm performance indicators. These suggested that the monitoring function and the market for corporate control were implemented as a corporate governance mechanism in Indonesia.
topic Causality
Corporate Governance
Firm Performance
Ownership Structure
url http://jurnal.unmer.ac.id/index.php/jkdp/article/view/2469
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