Cognitive Success: Instrumental Justifications of Normative Systems of Reasoning
In the first part of the paper (sec. 1-4), I argue that Elqayam and Evan's (2011) distinction between normative and instrumental conceptions of cognitive rationality corresponds to deontological versus teleological accounts in meta-ethics. I suggest that Elqayam and Evans' distinction be r...
Main Author: | Gerhard eSchurz |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2014-07-01
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Series: | Frontiers in Psychology |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00625/full |
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