Job complexity and wage bargaining

The objective of this paper is to qualify and discuss the effects of public policies according to bargaining solution used between workers and firms. We compare the effects of three solutions, Nash, Kalai-Smorod-insky and Equal-Sacrifice in a matching model where the job complexity is endogenous and...

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Main Author:	Samir AMINE
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Published:	General Association of Economists from Romania 2017-03-01
Series:	Theoretical and Applied Economics
Subjects:	Bargaining Nash Kalai-Smorodinsky Equal-Sacrifice Complexity Unemployment benefits
Online Access:	http://store.ectap.ro/articole/1254.pdf

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spelling	doaj-196ccb0c24e745f3a3ac560444edea232020-11-25T00:03:49ZengGeneral Association of Economists from RomaniaTheoretical and Applied Economics1841-86781844-00292017-03-01XXIV118919618418678Job complexity and wage bargainingSamir AMINE0 Université du Québec en Outaouais and CIRANO, Canada The objective of this paper is to qualify and discuss the effects of public policies according to bargaining solution used between workers and firms. We compare the effects of three solutions, Nash, Kalai-Smorod-insky and Equal-Sacrifice in a matching model where the job complexity is endogenous and workers are differentiated by their qualification level. We show that the choice of solution is extremely important since the effects of unemployment benefits on unemployment, labor market participation and on the job complexity can be completely opposite. http://store.ectap.ro/articole/1254.pdf BargainingNashKalai-SmorodinskyEqual-SacrificeComplexityUnemployment benefits
collection	DOAJ
language	English
format	Article
sources	DOAJ
author	Samir AMINE
spellingShingle	Samir AMINE Job complexity and wage bargaining Theoretical and Applied Economics Bargaining Nash Kalai-Smorodinsky Equal-Sacrifice Complexity Unemployment benefits
author_facet	Samir AMINE
author_sort	Samir AMINE
title	Job complexity and wage bargaining
title_short	Job complexity and wage bargaining
title_full	Job complexity and wage bargaining
title_fullStr	Job complexity and wage bargaining
title_full_unstemmed	Job complexity and wage bargaining
title_sort	job complexity and wage bargaining
publisher	General Association of Economists from Romania
series	Theoretical and Applied Economics
issn	1841-8678 1844-0029
publishDate	2017-03-01
description	The objective of this paper is to qualify and discuss the effects of public policies according to bargaining solution used between workers and firms. We compare the effects of three solutions, Nash, Kalai-Smorod-insky and Equal-Sacrifice in a matching model where the job complexity is endogenous and workers are differentiated by their qualification level. We show that the choice of solution is extremely important since the effects of unemployment benefits on unemployment, labor market participation and on the job complexity can be completely opposite.
topic	Bargaining Nash Kalai-Smorodinsky Equal-Sacrifice Complexity Unemployment benefits
url	http://store.ectap.ro/articole/1254.pdf
work_keys_str_mv	AT samiramine jobcomplexityandwagebargaining
_version_	1725431789449641984

Job complexity and wage bargaining

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