Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations
In auction environments in which agents have private values, the Vickrey auction induces agents to truthfully reveal their preferences and selects the efficient allocation accordingly. When the agents' valuations are interdependent, various generalizations of the Vickrey auction have been found...
Main Authors: | Kim-Sau Chung, Jeffrey C. Ely |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design
2019-11-01
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Series: | Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: |
http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v004-1/p_01.pdf
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