Some Results on the Control of Polluting Firms According to Dynamic Nash and Stackelberg Patterns
In this paper we model the conflict between the group of polluting firms in a country and any social planner in the same country who attempts to control the volume of emissions generated during the production process. Both players of the game have their own control policies, i.e., the rate of emissi...
Main Authors: | George E. Halkos, George J. Papageorgiou |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2021-05-01
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Series: | Economies |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7099/9/2/77 |
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