Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions

Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions

We study the convergence of two price processes generated by two dynamic double auctions (DA) and provide conditions under which the two price processes converge to a Walrasian equilibrium in the underlying economy. When the conditions are not satisfied, the price processes may result in a bubble or...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jinpeng Ma, Qiongling Li
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design 2016-12-01
Series:Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
Subjects:
Double auction mechanisms
incremental subgradient methods
network resource allocations
Online Access: http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v001-1/p_01.pdf
id doaj-1efc78a5a83e463ea145c662ccbb99d4
record_format Article
spelling doaj-1efc78a5a83e463ea145c662ccbb99d42020-11-24T22:14:49ZengSociety for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution DesignJournal of Mechanism and Institution Design2399-844X2399-84582016-12-011114410.22574/jmid.2016.12.001jmi-v1i1a1Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctionsJinpeng Ma0Qiongling Li1 Rutgers University, USA Rice University, USA We study the convergence of two price processes generated by two dynamic double auctions (DA) and provide conditions under which the two price processes converge to a Walrasian equilibrium in the underlying economy. When the conditions are not satisfied, the price processes may result in a bubble or crash. http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v001-1/p_01.pdf Double auction mechanismsincremental subgradient methodsnetwork resource allocations
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Jinpeng Ma
Qiongling Li
spellingShingle Jinpeng Ma
Qiongling Li
Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
Double auction mechanisms
incremental subgradient methods
network resource allocations
author_facet Jinpeng Ma
Qiongling Li
author_sort Jinpeng Ma
title Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions
title_short Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions
title_full Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions
title_fullStr Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions
title_full_unstemmed Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions
title_sort convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions
publisher Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design
series Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
issn 2399-844X
2399-8458
publishDate 2016-12-01
description We study the convergence of two price processes generated by two dynamic double auctions (DA) and provide conditions under which the two price processes converge to a Walrasian equilibrium in the underlying economy. When the conditions are not satisfied, the price processes may result in a bubble or crash.
topic Double auction mechanisms
incremental subgradient methods
network resource allocations
url http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v001-1/p_01.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT jinpengma convergenceofpriceprocessesundertwodynamicdoubleauctions
AT qionglingli convergenceofpriceprocessesundertwodynamicdoubleauctions
_version_ 1725796950261891072

Similar Items