Incoerenza temporale e indipendenza della banca centrale

<p>According to the author, the emphasis authors currently tend to place on the 'surprise effect' in order to argue for the independence of central banks is to a large extent unjustified. The main arguments for the independence of a cen-tral bank are others: firstly, the opinion that...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Bruno Jossa
Format: Article
Language:Italian
Published: Associazione Economia civile 2012-04-01
Series:Moneta e Credito
Online Access:http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/monetaecredito/article/view/9678
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Summary:<p>According to the author, the emphasis authors currently tend to place on the 'surprise effect' in order to argue for the independence of central banks is to a large extent unjustified. The main arguments for the independence of a cen-tral bank are others: firstly, the opinion that governments are induced to in-cur excessive expenditure due to reasons highlighted by public choice theo-rists and, secondly, the idea that inflation arises in connection with social conflict. Additionally, this study makes it clear that 'time inconsistency' theory is far from being a new way of stating old ideas.</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>&nbsp;</p><p><br /><strong>JEL Codes: </strong>E58</p><p><br /><strong>Keywords: </strong></p>
ISSN:2037-3651