Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition
Participants in the cognitive phenomenology debate have proceeded by (a) proposing a bifurcation of theoretical options into inflationary and non-inflationary theories, and then (b) providing arguments for/against one of these theories. I suggest that this method has failed to illuminate the common...
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doaj-27da92fb834344aa98b4c77e1d43f06b2020-11-25T02:47:40ZengFirenze University PressPhenomenology and Mind2280-78532239-40282017-01-011010.13128/Phe_Mi-2009716857Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and CognitionPhilip Woodward Participants in the cognitive phenomenology debate have proceeded by (a) proposing a bifurcation of theoretical options into inflationary and non-inflationary theories, and then (b) providing arguments for/against one of these theories. I suggest that this method has failed to illuminate the commonalities and differences among conscious intentional states of different types, in the absence of a theory of the structure of these states. I propose such a theory. In perception, phenomenal-intentional properties combine with somatosensory properties to form P-I property clusters that serve as phenomenal modes of presentations of particulars. In imagination, somatosensory properties are replaced with phenomenal-intentional properties whose intentional objects are somatosensory properties, thus resulting in imaginative facsimiles of perceptual P-I property clusters. Such structures can then be used as phenomenal prototypes that pick out individuals and kinds. Sets of such prototypes constitute a subject’s conception of individuals and kinds. Combined with a few additional elements, these imaginative P-I property clusters serve as the building-blocks of conscious cognitive states. Different ways of carving up theoretical space classify my theory either as inflationary or as non-inflationary. I conclude that the theory is anti-inflationary in letter but inflationary in spirit. https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7234cognitive phenomenologyphenomenal intentionalityperceptionimagination |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Philip Woodward |
spellingShingle |
Philip Woodward Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition Phenomenology and Mind cognitive phenomenology phenomenal intentionality perception imagination |
author_facet |
Philip Woodward |
author_sort |
Philip Woodward |
title |
Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition |
title_short |
Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition |
title_full |
Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition |
title_fullStr |
Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition |
title_full_unstemmed |
Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition |
title_sort |
conscious intentionality in perception, imagination, and cognition |
publisher |
Firenze University Press |
series |
Phenomenology and Mind |
issn |
2280-7853 2239-4028 |
publishDate |
2017-01-01 |
description |
Participants in the cognitive phenomenology debate have proceeded by (a) proposing a bifurcation of theoretical options into inflationary and non-inflationary theories, and then (b) providing arguments for/against one of these theories. I suggest that this method has failed to illuminate the commonalities and differences among conscious intentional states of different types, in the absence of a theory of the structure of these states. I propose such a theory. In perception, phenomenal-intentional properties combine with somatosensory properties to form P-I property clusters that serve as phenomenal modes of presentations of particulars. In imagination, somatosensory properties are replaced with phenomenal-intentional properties whose intentional objects are somatosensory properties, thus resulting in imaginative facsimiles of perceptual P-I property clusters. Such structures can then be used as phenomenal prototypes that pick out individuals and kinds. Sets of such prototypes constitute a subject’s conception of individuals and kinds. Combined with a few additional elements, these imaginative P-I property clusters serve as the building-blocks of conscious cognitive states. Different ways of carving up theoretical space classify my theory either as inflationary or as non-inflationary. I conclude that the theory is anti-inflationary in letter but inflationary in spirit.
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topic |
cognitive phenomenology phenomenal intentionality perception imagination |
url |
https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7234 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT philipwoodward consciousintentionalityinperceptionimaginationandcognition |
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