| Summary: | The same as with many other concepts, once one considers the concept of power more closely, fundamental questions arise, such as whether a power relation is necessarily a relation of subordination and domination, a view that makes it difficult to identify legitimate forms of the exercise of power. To contribute to conceptual as well as normative clarification, I suggest a novel way to conceive of power. I argue that we only understand what power is and how it is exercised once we understand its essentially <em>noumenal</em> nature. I claim that the real and general phenomenon of power is to be found in the noumenal realm, that is, in the <em>space of reasons</em>, understood as the realm of justifications. On that basis, I defend a normatively neutral notion of power that enables us to distinguish more particular forms of power, such as rule, coercion, or domination. The analysis aims to prepare the way for a critical theory of power.<br /><br />
|
|---|
