Trade Credit and Revenue Sharing of Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer
In this paper, we develop three supply chain game models, i.e., the basic model, the single trade credit model, and the trade credit and revenue sharing collaboration model. Conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) criterion is used as the measure of risk assessment in these models. We analyze the optimal d...
Main Authors: | Caiyun Liu, Kebing Chen, Mingxia Li, Haijie Zhou |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Hindawi Limited
2021-01-01
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Series: | Mathematical Problems in Engineering |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/9781561 |
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