On Key Evolution over Wireless Channels
Noise is a powerful resource for the implementation of cryptographic primitives, especially in wireless networks. In general, a key agreement protocol is tailored to the channels and relies on the assumption that knowledge on the eavesdropper's channel is available. This is not practical. In th...
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2015-07-01
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Series: | International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks |
Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1155/2015/592848 |
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doaj-29efb5ea07aa4553a2fcda90b6bc25ef2020-11-25T03:17:14ZengSAGE PublishingInternational Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks1550-14772015-07-011110.1155/2015/592848592848On Key Evolution over Wireless ChannelsZhihong Liu0Yong Zeng1Pingjuan Zhang2Qiping Huang3 The School of Computer Science and Technology, Xidian University, Xi'an 710071, China The School of Computer Science and Technology, Xidian University, Xi'an 710071, China The School of Computer Science and Technology, Xidian University, Xi'an 710071, China School of Communication Engineering, Xidian University, Xi'an 710071, ChinaNoise is a powerful resource for the implementation of cryptographic primitives, especially in wireless networks. In general, a key agreement protocol is tailored to the channels and relies on the assumption that knowledge on the eavesdropper's channel is available. This is not practical. In this paper, we focus on the problem of developing key agreement schemes for secure communication across wireless channels and propose a key evolution scheme to alleviate the assumption. Keys evolve continuously based on the transmitted messages over the noisy wireless channel. Even if the eavesdropper's channel is superior to the legitimate receiver, the legitimate parties can establish secret keys. To further confuse the eavesdropper, we present a strategy for legitimate parties to send artificial noise if the eavesdropper cannot distinguish the sources of messages. Finally, we propose a k -resistant encryption scheme that can use different keys to encrypt and decrypt messages if there are no more than k bits which differ between the encryption and decryption keys.https://doi.org/10.1155/2015/592848 |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Zhihong Liu Yong Zeng Pingjuan Zhang Qiping Huang |
spellingShingle |
Zhihong Liu Yong Zeng Pingjuan Zhang Qiping Huang On Key Evolution over Wireless Channels International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks |
author_facet |
Zhihong Liu Yong Zeng Pingjuan Zhang Qiping Huang |
author_sort |
Zhihong Liu |
title |
On Key Evolution over Wireless Channels |
title_short |
On Key Evolution over Wireless Channels |
title_full |
On Key Evolution over Wireless Channels |
title_fullStr |
On Key Evolution over Wireless Channels |
title_full_unstemmed |
On Key Evolution over Wireless Channels |
title_sort |
on key evolution over wireless channels |
publisher |
SAGE Publishing |
series |
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks |
issn |
1550-1477 |
publishDate |
2015-07-01 |
description |
Noise is a powerful resource for the implementation of cryptographic primitives, especially in wireless networks. In general, a key agreement protocol is tailored to the channels and relies on the assumption that knowledge on the eavesdropper's channel is available. This is not practical. In this paper, we focus on the problem of developing key agreement schemes for secure communication across wireless channels and propose a key evolution scheme to alleviate the assumption. Keys evolve continuously based on the transmitted messages over the noisy wireless channel. Even if the eavesdropper's channel is superior to the legitimate receiver, the legitimate parties can establish secret keys. To further confuse the eavesdropper, we present a strategy for legitimate parties to send artificial noise if the eavesdropper cannot distinguish the sources of messages. Finally, we propose a k -resistant encryption scheme that can use different keys to encrypt and decrypt messages if there are no more than k bits which differ between the encryption and decryption keys. |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1155/2015/592848 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT zhihongliu onkeyevolutionoverwirelesschannels AT yongzeng onkeyevolutionoverwirelesschannels AT pingjuanzhang onkeyevolutionoverwirelesschannels AT qipinghuang onkeyevolutionoverwirelesschannels |
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